The Qualiafications (or Lack Thereof) of Epiphenomenal Qualia
Humanities
Philosophy of Psychology
This paper is an academic evaluation of 'qualia' as part of the mind, and the consequences that arise from classifying them as epiphenomenal rather than pheomenal. The conclusion that I support is ultimately that by labeling qualia as epiphenomenal, proponents of qualia sacrifice the legitimacy and worth of their claims, and thus, that the stipulation that qualia be considered epiphenomenal in order to be taken seriously is unnecessary and ultimately harmful to the case for qualia insofar as it negatively impacts philosophical and psychological research concerning them. The over arching concern of the paper is to caution philosophers of mind against reducing claims in order to fit current paradigms of rationality and belief insofar as doing so may lead to academic complacency and nullification of the significance of said claims.
