

Political Participation of Students in Istanbul: Revitalized Turkish Youth as Influential Political Actors

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Abstract: This paper analyzes the conflict in Istanbul, Turkey, that began during the summer of 2013 in Gezi Park and Taksim Square, widely known as the "Gezi Park Protests". The focus of this paper is on the university student age-group and how they have affected, and will continue to affect, Turkish politics, specifically the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) platform. My research is based on original data collected in the spring of 2014 with nine universities in Istanbul and interviews with current university undergraduates who participated in the Gezi Park protests. While only time will tell the influence that the protests have made in Turkey, I argue that the newly political youth hold potential to greatly influence Turkish politics, and require a new dialogue that strays from the mainstream idea that Turkish youths are apolitical.

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Introduction

In the summer of 2013 I lived in Istanbul, Turkey, and studied at Bogaziçi University, during the climax of the Gezi Park protests. I witnessed varied activism, some violent, in Istanbul, Turkey's largest city with roughly 14 million occupants.¹ My interest in these particular protests stems from two events: First, the prevailing idea in Turkish political dialogue that the young population in the country is largely apolitical, and secondly, my personal experience in seeing such a large percentage of the activists being young college-educated individuals. My analysis was brought to life with the help of many students and faculty that I met at numerous universities in Istanbul who participated and in a survey that I produced — the transcript for which can be found at the end of this paper. Due to the time gap between the Gezi protests and the current political situation in Turkey, the initial portion of my study will explain the changes that have occurred.

This paper will analyze the Gezi Park movement beginning in May of 2013, centering upon the role that students in Istanbul played in the activism. This paper addresses the shortcomings of the analysis by academia and mainstream news on the reasoning for the Gezi Protests and the role that the student-aged population has played. I argue that the dominant discourse on Turkish youth as an apolitical faction can no longer lead evaluations of the politics in Turkey. Rather, the Gezi Park protests have shown the increasing power and potential that the Turkish youth have to influence political decision-making in their long-term goals. First, key definitions, background, and specific events will be reviewed in this paper. The penultimate section will address the results of the survey I have conducted in numerous universities in Istanbul on political participation and activism. Finally, with a knowledgeable understanding of the political climate in Turkey coupled with the findings of my survey, I offer what I hope is an

informed dialogue on the connection between Turkey's young and educated population and the future of Turkish politics.

Key Definitions

For clarification purposes a few key terms must be defined. By “student population in Istanbul” I mean those who are currently in university, either at the undergraduate or graduate level, and those who have recently graduated. The justification for this categorization is the fact that roughly half of Turkey's population is under the age of 30, with more than a third under 20.² According to the figures produced by the Turkish Bureau of Statistics, almost 10% of Turks are within the age range of 25-29, making them the largest single-age group in the country.³ I use the word “youth” to identify this university student age range. I define “protestor” as anyone who has politically participated in the conflict, whether in physical action or online, not restricted to those at the initial park demonstrations. Finally, when speaking of the Gezi Park protests, I mean to encapsulate the collective social activism — marches, public demonstrations, sit-ins, etc. — that emerged in reaction to the violence encountered during the initial sit-in at Gezi Park, which has widened to form a social movement against the perceived authoritarianism of the AKP and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Due to the fact that this paper was finalized during the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the spring of 2014, I would like to remind the readers that in 2013 he held the position of Prime Minister. In August of 2014 he was elected to the presidency with roughly 52% of the national vote, as he was constitutionally barred from running for Prime Minister for another term.⁴ Although the substantial controversy that surrounds President Erdoğan will be discussed in great length in latter sections of this paper, it is worth noting that he is the first democratically elected President in Turkey, expanding the powers of the President further than

its historically ceremonial role.⁵ This political transition is important in connection with many of Erdoğan's opponents who accuse his party of manipulating the political system in Turkey to guarantee their own success. In 2007, President Erdoğan's party, the Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) backed a constitutional amendment to formally transition the country into a semi-presidential regime, shortening the presidential term from seven years to five, expanding presidential powers, and allowing election from popular vote instead of parliamentary vote.⁶

Background on the Gezi Park Protests

The catalyst for the assembly of activists commonly referred to as the “Gezi Park protests” began in late May 2013, when a few environmentalists from the group Taksim Solidarity gathered in Gezi Park to conduct a peaceful protest.⁷ They opposed the planned demolition of Gezi Park—one of the few green areas in Istanbul, located at Taksim Square. On May 27, 2013, the police used heavy force to expel the protestors, including tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets. Like wildfire, social media blew up with reports of violence used against protestors by the police. Protestors and witnesses, many of whom were young, used social media—mostly Twitter and Facebook—to spread news and provide documentation of the attack. During the initial police confrontation, “more than 61,000 tweets [were] sent with the hashtag #geziparkı, and photos and videos from the crackdown [were] trending worldwide.”⁸ Within five days, the Beyoğlu district teemed with more than 100,000 activists opposing the police brutality and authoritarianism of Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP. On May 31, 2013, protests had spread to other districts in Istanbul and large cities around the country, while hundreds of protestors walked across the Bosphorus Bridge in solidarity with the activists.⁹

The proposed demolition of Gezi Park had been underway for many years, starting in 2011 to renovate Taksim's city center, a top tourist attraction.¹⁰ The importance of this location is of utmost importance — Gezi Park and the neighboring Taksim Square remain historically symbolic, as they are contested spaces prone to numerous violent clashes where many groups have attempted to influence Turkish politics. In 1936 the Turkish Republic planned to create Taksim as a cultural and recreational area of the Republic.

Korhan Gümüş, one of Turkey's leading architects and urban planners, argues that Taksim gained a political identity with the intervention of the Republic, becoming a fighting ground for the nation-state.¹¹ Taksim Square embodies the struggle over who can dominate public spaces — what he claims is a stage for social design. Gümüş added that each successive government after Taksim Square's creation has attempted to leave its mark, with a history of protests and dissatisfaction when urban redevelopment in the square is seen as having political motives.¹² For example, in 1994 when controversy sparked over whether President Erdoğan, the mayor of Istanbul at the time, was planning to construct a mosque there. The potential demolition of Gezi Park elicited a response that did not only address the issue of the absence of a green space within the city, but also the argument for the right to public activism in that space.¹³ What is overlooked in the history of activism within Taksim Square and Gezi Park, however, are the demographics of the protestors.

Many attempts have been made to explain what the Gezi protests represent, but it has amounted to a plethora of analysis with far too narrow a scope. The movement did not gain momentum because of the potential uprooting of the Sycamore trees in Gezi Park; it did so in reaction to the police brutality against those peacefully staging a sit-in and the backing of President Erdoğan to continue the police brutality. Further, the movement is not solely a

secularist response to the AKP's religious stance.¹⁴ Rather, it is an accumulation of responses to the policies and restrictive measures by government that affect everyday life that have given rise to a movement. This new movement is profoundly dissatisfied with the inadequate answers to the promises made in 2002 and 2003 during the first election of the AKP and President Erdoğan.¹⁵

The Justice and Development Party (AKP)

A brief background on the history and platform of the AKP and President Erdoğan is needed for an informed understanding of the backlash against them. The AKP, or the Justice and Development Party, is the ruling political party in Turkey. It is a center-right conservative party formed in 2001 by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, after breaking away from the Virtue Party that was banned for anti-secular activities in 2001.¹⁶ The success of the AKP is historic in that, from 2002 until 2011, the AKP increased its support (percent of votes) from 34.28% to 49.9%. It was the second time since the creation of the Republic in 1946 that a party had won three consecutive elections, and the first time that the percentage of the vote increased with each election.¹⁷ The AKP's success was unprecedented, as all other Islamist parties had been shut down by either a ruling by the constitutional court or military intervention.¹⁸ In local elections in March of 2014, the AKP's support fell for the first time, losing 16 mayoral seats, and decreasing the general vote to 45%.¹⁹

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected Istanbul's mayor, served from 1994-1998, and was elected Prime Minister in 2003 as head of the AKP. At the beginning of his career, Erdoğan was popular, as he produced overall economic and political stability, and decreased the power of the army that had previously overthrown elected governments. Nevertheless, his critics argued his main ambitions were to put more power in the hands of the President so he could run for the

position (which he did, and won), as well to disregard any dissent to his platform while aiming to create a religious society in place of secularism.²⁰ Recently, Erdoğan's popularity has waned due to intense criticism related to corruption scandals, his refusal to allow investigations into the potential corruption, alleged international human rights violations as a result of police brutality in the Gezi protests, and an overall increase in domestic dissatisfaction.

The AKP was the largest supported political movement in Turkish history, thought to bring economic and political stability to a state previously plagued by corruption and volatility.²¹ The protests formed in reaction to what is perceived as the hidden agenda and corruption of the AKP's promise to leave these issues behind and bring a new domestic harmony. Over the last decade, the AKP's supports have been "a loyal coalition of the working class and religious conservatives...but now, [he] faces the possibility of new opponents"²² — those who identify with the opposition to his authoritarian policies, and most importantly the newly political youth population.

The AKP and Turkish Youth

In an interview with the New York Times prior to the 2011 elections, a twenty-six year old campaigner for the AKP youth group, Zehra Altinas, said, "Because young people completely withdrew from politics in the 1980s and the 1990s, Turkey's youth is depoliticized, but we are working to change that."²³ Due to the military coup in 1980, the "legacy of the coup" had depoliticized a significant portion of the population, given that university students had been constitutionally barred from both membership in political parties as well as general political activity when the voting age was raised to 21. The 1980 coup was partly provoked by violence between youth organizations on the political left and right.²⁴ In 1982 the voting age was lowered to 20, and in 1995, the age was again lowered to 18. Altinas believes that the effects of the ban

remain instilled within the youth population, but the election of 2011 provoked a greater mobilization of youth participation, especially in the AKP's campaign.²⁵ The 1995 amendments to the Turkish constitution also lowered the age from 21 to 18 for people to join political parties, extended the right to vote to citizens living outside the country, recognized the right to unionize (but not protest) for civil servants, allowed teachers and students in higher education institutions to access political party membership, and permitted political parties to have youth and women's branches.²⁶

In addition, the youth vote carried significant weight in the 2011 parliamentary campaign, and the youth organizations within the parties were pointedly active. Adil Gur, the head of the polling company A&G research, stated in 2011 that youth unemployment levels and a government scandal regarding University entrance exams was likely to dissuade some of the young voters away from the AKP, despite the fact that the AKP was still likely win among them and the general population.²⁷




Figure 1- Data from the World Values Survey 2011

The breakdown of the 2011 votes (based on data from the Sixth Wave of the World Values Survey, 2011) by education levels can be found in Figure 1.²⁸ The blue columns represent votes for the AKP; the red columns represent votes for the CHP (the Republican People's Party).

Figure 1 is broken down by education levels of the respondents with the number of survey respondents in each category in parenthesis.²⁹ There is a stark contrast between those with less than secondary education who vote overwhelmingly for the AKP and university-educated voters leaning towards the CHP.³⁰ In my own survey on the political ideology of those currently attending university in Istanbul, reviewed and discussed later, there is an overwhelming majority of voting preference towards the CHP.

The Youth Protestors

Discourse in the last four decades on political participation of the youth in Turkey has been dominated by the idea that this age group has been largely apolitical.³¹ The Gezi Protests have shown a widespread increase in young and educated individuals taking action to confront their political dissatisfactions—“young people protesting day in and day out in major cities, putting up barricades to guard against police attacks, coming up with humorous critiques of government policies, forming discussion forums in parks, and practicing participatory democracy at a neighborhood level”³²—and this transformation demands a new analysis that leaves behind the dominant “apolitical” dialogue. Youth participation in the Gezi protests came as a surprise to analysts, and it has shown the shortcomings of the politically apathetic approach to Turkish youth. This paper addresses the integral transformation of the Turkish youth from a largely apolitical group to a politically active influential body based on new research devoted to confronting the specific role of the student-aged population.

Of those who participated during the 2013 protests, many were young and educated individuals, as might be expected since Istanbul is the home of 45 public and private universities. A KONDA (A Research and Consultancy Company) research survey found the average age of the protestors to be 28 years old. KONDA and GENAR conducted surveys on the demographics

represented in the protests.³³ Coşkun Taştan, in “The Gezi Park Protests: A Qualitative Field Research,” identifies three main categories within the demographic of protestors at Gezi and in the resulting protests: “atypical CHP voters,” young radicals, and anti-systemic party supporters.³⁴

The largest category of protestors, roughly 50%, is the “atypical CHP voters.” They are characterized as young individuals who were raised by “typical CHP voters,” or families that electorally support the CHP (acronym for the Republican People’s Party, a modern social democratic-party). The “atypical CHP voters” in the protests are those who are young and distrustful of political parties, although they vote for the CHP at the polls. The reasons the atypical group votes for the CHP differ among protestors, yet a common reason is that the CHP is seen as the most influential adversary to the AKP.³⁵ The second largest portion of protestors (~30%) identify as young radical individuals with no trust in political institutions or parties, and feel that participating in party politics will have no influence on a tangible outcome. Taştan reasons that this group keeps party politics at bay due to the ideology that the Turkish political system is the product of global imperialist powers, and cannot be changed by domestic influence. For this reason, this group does not participate in the electoral process. The third and smallest group is a collection of radical leftists, who support political parties that fall below the minimum 10% election threshold in Turkey—the minimum votes a party can win in order to secure representative seats.³⁶ This group makes up less than 5%, i.e., those who believe in the power of the anti-systemic parties rather than the institutionalized representatives.³⁷

The three categories illuminated by Taştan show the majority of protestors being young and politically active, whether pro or anti-institution.³⁸ Clearly, the youth in Istanbul are no longer “apolitical.” Although roughly half of the protestors addressed by Taştan’s analysis did

not believe they could have influence in party politics, they were still actively participating in grassroots organizing and activism on the streets. Looking at the youth as apolitical simply because there is a lower than average electoral turnout neglects the power, influence, and participation embodied by the act of protests itself. The major challenge to the dominant apolitical discourse, in light of the Gezi protests, is that the analysis negates a large portion of Turkish youth who do not fall into the traditional definition of political participation. When addressing political participation from the view represented in this paper — namely, that participation does not solely mean engaging in party politics, but rather includes the larger movement of activism and protest as well — the youth protestors clearly do not embody an apolitical group, but have begun to address their dissatisfaction in activism that was previously disregarded by analysts.

Istanbul's Universities Survey Report

I conducted interviews and a survey at numerous universities in Istanbul from April-June 2014 to gauge the political influence and opinions of the student population. The aim of this research was to analyze how the student population in Istanbul has reacted towards the 11-year AKP regime, as well as its role in the social movement that began in 2013. A complete transcript of the questions asked may be found at the end of this paper. From the schools that were surveyed, a majority of the feedback came from Yeditepe University and Boğaziçi University, fewer responses from Istanbul University, Yıldız Teknik University, Bahçeşehir University, Okan University, Nişantaşı University, and Doğu University.

The average age of respondents was twenty, with 94.9% stating they had been born in Turkey, and 89.14% stating that they had grown up in a large city such as Istanbul, Ankara, or Izmir. While the OECD better life index found that 32% of Turks had earned the equivalent of a

high school diploma,³⁹ my research found that just over 48.65% of the students surveyed had parents who had achieved at least a university diploma. This is a glaring contrast with the national data as a whole because, within city centers, families have a greater emphasis on, and attendance to, higher education. The results of my survey have been translated into graphs, to which we will now turn.




Figure 2 compares the results for the questions “Do you consider yourself a Muslim?” and “Do you want Turkey to be secular?” While 72.22% of respondents identified as Muslim, an overwhelming majority (94.59%) wants Turkey to be secular, which

contradicts the notion that an Islamic state demand anti-secular policies. Not surprisingly, given that Islam is the largest religion in the country, 97.8% of Turkish citizens identified as following Islam in a 2007 poll. One polarizing issue in Turkish politics today is pro-secularism versus pro-Islamic politics, with a high rate of pro-secularism in the Istanbul university setting.




Figure 3

Figure 3 compares the percentage of students who said they participated in the first week of the protests in Gezi Park or Taksim to those who said they participated in the resulting protests against Prime Minister Erdoğan after the first week. 62.16% of respondents said they had participated in the first week, but this increased to 81.08% in the following week. These data show a legitimate contribution from the youth in Istanbul to the political activism that spread through the city. Simultaneously, these results allow us to view the students as a major stimulus for the rise in activism.





Figure 4 and 5 show the percentage of students who voted in the parliamentary elections on March 30, 2014 (left), and the party that they voted for (right). With 83.78% of respondents voting in the most recent election, Figure 5 shows a clear majority of support for the CHP (90%



of the votes). The AKP, MHP (The Nationalist Movement Party), and HDP (The People’s Democratic Party) each received 3.33% of votes.

Figure 6 compares the answers to two questions—“Do you support the AKP?” and “Do you support Prime

Minister Erdoğan?”—in order to straightforwardly show the dissatisfaction of the university students in Istanbul towards the ruling government and the Prime Minister. 94.59% of respondents said they did not support the AKP, nor did they support Prime Minister Erdoğan.

Analysis of the University Student Research

The data collected in this survey allows for a detailed analysis of the role that university students in Istanbul have played in the Gezi Park protests. While other analysts have addressed similar questions in viewing the reasoning and timing of the protests, there has been a lack of data showing the massive increase in youth political participation and its integral function in producing widespread activism. This data clearly explains a major transformation of Istanbul’s youth into a group of highly active individuals — participating within institutions as well as in political arenas outside of party politics. The youth are not only proactive but reactive in political participation, as shown in the large number of students who protested both in the initial confrontation at Gezi Park and in the resulting protests that took place throughout the city.

I interviewed Firat, a third-year undergraduate at Istanbul’s Yeditepe University, who has been active in the Gezi Protests since May of 2013. We spoke about the goal of the protests, the role he played in them, as well as what demographic he felt represented the majority of protestors. He stated: “[A] majority of the protestors were young and in Istanbul... But it is not just limited [to] Istanbul, but all around Turkey. A majority of the protestors were young and high[ly] educated. After the police’s out-of-proportion strike upon us [the protestors], elders joined the protests because most of them thought the police [were] literally trying to kill us. Many people were injured, died, and were paralyzed. After the police’s ‘huge’ strikes, people all around Turkey resisted the police to save young people’s lives. And Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said this: ‘the police are writing a history.’”⁴⁰ In knowing that the government had sent the police in

the first place, he added, “Tayyip Erdoğan went to Morocco during the protests. And in my opinion this means: I don’t care about my citizens lives and wants.” The research survey done alongside Firat’s opinion has shown similar views of President Erdoğan and his party, with almost all respondents saying they do not support the AKP or Erdoğan. Almost all respondents also voted for the CHP in the last parliamentary election. However, dissatisfaction does not necessarily produce tangible change — the AKP won a majority of seats again in 2014.

Many believe Erdoğan plans to run for President this summer in an attempt to remain in power. Firat said that he was not expecting the protests to substantially influential politics: “...Gezi Park protests weren’t managed well after some point. And the AKP is not listening to anybody who opposes them. Tayyip Erdoğan likes to divide citizens by who supports him and who doesn’t; he is a modern dictator.” Responding to whether he wanted the protests to continue if he did not feel that they were influencing politics enough, he said, “Of course I want them to continue. If we can build a common ground against the AKP, we can change everything. But first we have to change the government. The main point of the Gezi Park protest was [originally] concerning nature—just trees and parks. In my opinion, Gezi Park protestors have to establish a political party to fight the government’s policies.”

The Gezi Party [GZP] was born from the conflict, although it has far too few supporters to be able to reach the 10% threshold to enter government, the highest of any country. Firat stated that he doesn’t think, “99% of the protestors know [it even exists]...the GZP doesn’t have any supporters. Because what we are trying to do is build a [singular] powerful opposition against the AKP. But we failed against at the local elections this year [March 2014 elections].”

A tension between creating a new party and continuing to support the CHP for the purpose of taking influence away from the AKP has resulted in a fractured movement. Developing a singular movement united against the AKP is not as easy as taking to the streets.

Aykan Erdemir, a junior CHP deputy, believes that the March 30, 2014 election has “signaled that the era of single-party government is nearing an end.”⁴¹ He argues that because President Erdoğan skillfully manages the public’s perception, views on the AKP’s continued strength have been overestimated. “If people went to the ballot box today for general elections based on the current rules of election,” he held, “the AKP could only send 275 to 280 deputies to the Parliament, where they would barely form a single-party government.”⁴² Yet he argues that no one is talking about this in Turkey because of Erdoğan’s success in keeping this information and dialogue repressed.

The CHP has the backing of the student population in Istanbul, as 90% of respondents to my survey voted for them this March, but there are several obstacles in their way. The CHP has failed to incorporate the message of the Gezi Park protests. Erdemir argues that the protestors “not only demand [the CHP’s] support, the right narrative or even the right policies. They demanded that this country step up against gerontocracy. This is not a problem exclusive to the CHP, but definitely half of the population objects to being ruled by an older generation dominated by men.”⁴³ The CHP’s party council and central governing council are mostly dominated by a group of senior politicians as well. For the CHP to gain an increasing number of voters and to embody the message of the Gezi Protests, they need to incorporate a higher number of young individuals who can reflect the values and identity of the protestors. Much can be learned from the feminists in Turkish politics who have united many in criticism of the insufficient representation of women in Parliament. The youths have yet to present such a united

voice. Despite making up roughly half of the population⁴⁴, they represent less than 10% of Parliament.⁴⁵

The CHP has come to an interesting break from the past 11 years of the AKP's rule. They now have the opportunity to capture the support of not only the "atypical CHP voter," but also other young individuals who do not feel that there are any parties who adequately represent the needs of this young and newly active political body. Given that the AKP's support is winding down, and assembling a political party from scratch seems unlikely due to the 10% threshold, the ball is in the CHP's court. Many of the respondents in Istanbul's universities said that within the last five years their opinions of the AKP and Erdoğan have changed, leaving this group capable of having major significance in upcoming elections, and while the process may need more than one election, the AKP has weakened to a point of vulnerability in light of the immense opposition.

Concluding Thoughts

A 2014 Eurostat survey found that Turkey has the largest youth population of any European country (18,862,319). The Institute of Strategic Thinking (SDE) and the Civil Servants' Trade Union (Memur-Sen), conducted a survey in conversation with the Eurostat research, finding "that 21.5 percent of those young people who participated in the poll are "apolitical."⁴⁶ Turkish youth, simply in numbers, have a large potential to influence Turkish politics. Research that has been done on the topic of student youth political participation has continued to approach the topic from the traditional discourse of apathy.⁴⁷ The research presented within this paper confronts this inadequacy, arguing for a new approach to analyzing political participation of the student youth.

Ayça Alemdaroglu, during her research in 2000 on student apathy in Turkey, found that “despite their self-proclaimed interest in politics,” the youth were still engaged in politics — talking about it and forming opinions on politicians and their ideas. She argued that rather than being apolitical students were cynical.⁴⁸ The uprising during the Gezi Protests has informed a new analysis, leaving behind the dominant apolitical view, calling for a novel approach to the country’s largest population. The cynicism Alemdaroglu found in 2000 has turned into distrust, ultimately producing the Gezi Park protests. The Turkish youth are not apolitical if we view political participation as encapsulating activism and protest, alongside participation in institutions and party politics. Clearly the terms “apathy” and “apolitical” can no longer lead these analyses on Turkish youth. The goal for the Gezi movement now is to continue to build momentum, and to formulate the most influential path against the AKP.

While my research shows incredibly high rates of political participation of university students in Istanbul, hurdles still remain. The youth have to organize their momentum in order to singularly and forcefully combat the power of the AKP. Political power must no longer be perceived as excluding the youth, and the youth must continue to stand up for their ideas and dissatisfactions. One aspect stemming from the protests is clear: The power behind this youth group is unique, and with the organization to fully harness this strength increasingly possible, this bold and creative new political body will become a growing and widely influential augmentation of Turkish politics.

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“Political Participation of Students in Istanbul” Survey Questions:

The survey was conducted electronically and was completely anonymous.

The questions were translated in both Turkish and English.

Respondents answered from late April to early June 2014.

1. Kaç yaşındasınız?
[How old are you?]
2. Türkiyede mi doğdunuz?
[Were you born in Turkey?]
3. Zamanınızın çoğu büyük şehirde mi (İstanbul, Ankara vb.) yoksa nüfusu daha az olan kırsal bir kesimde mi geçti?
[Have you spent most of your life in a city (Istanbul, Ankara, etc.) or in more rural areas with smaller populations?]
4. Kendinizi müslüman olarak mı tanımlıyorsunuz?
[Do you consider yourself a Muslim?]
5. Türkiye'nin daha laik bi yer olması gerektiğini düşünüyor musunuz?
[Do you want Turkey to be secular?]
6. Şu anda üniversiteye gidiyor musunuz?
[Do you currently go to University?]
7. Hangi üniversiteye gidiyorsunuz?
[What University do you attend?]
8. Eğer gitmiyorsanız, bir üniversiteden mezun musunuz?
[If you do not go to University now, have you graduated from a University?]
9. Anne veya babanızdan biri yada ikisi üniversite mezunu mu?
[Did one or more of your parents graduate from University?]
10. İlk haftasında Gezi Parkı'ndaki eylemlere katıldınız mı?
[Did you protest in Gezi Park during the first week in Gezi Park/Taksim?]
11. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a karşı daha sonraki haftalarda bir eylemde bulundunuz mu?
[Did you protests against Erdoğan after the first week?]
12. 30 Mart 2014 tarihindeki seçimlerde oy kullandınız mı?
[Did you vote in the most recent parliamentary election on March 30, 2014?]
13. AKP'yi destekliyor musunuz?
[Do you support the AKP?]

14. Başbakan Erdoğan'ı destekliyor musunuz?
[Do you support Prime Minister Erdoğan?]
15. Eğer oy kullandıysanız hangi partiye oy verdiniz?
[If you did vote on March 30th in the parliamentary elections, which party did you vote for?]
16. Son 5 yılda, Başbakan Erdoğan'la ilgili düşünceleriniz değişti mi?
[In the last 5 years, did you change your opinion of Prime Minister Erdoğan?]
17. Son 5 yılda, AKP'ye karşı düşünceleriniz değişti mi?
[In the last 5 years, did you change your opinion of the AKP?]