Apartheid and the Bloody Origins of Khayelitsha

Khayelitsha, a product of apartheid urbanity, is one of the world’s most infamous slums as well as the fastest growing township in South Africa. This settlement in the Western Cape was founded by violence and bloodshed and it remains that way today, making repeated headlines as the murder capital of South Africa. As typical of racially segregated apartheid developments, it was planned with inadequate infrastructure and services. Its deprived urban shantytowns are sprawling districts of crime. In 2017, statistics compiled by Habitat for Humanity cited Khayelitsha as the world’s fifth largest slum with 400,000 inhabitants. Today, the estimate is at 2.4 million, with a 90.5% Black African population. Apartheid’s segregationist politics in its “divide and rule strategy” were explicit to this township’s creation and bloody origins. Apartheid separated not only races from each other, but even further divided blacks along tribal lines. In addition, those daring to labor in white areas were pitted against each other by classification into urban blacks who were afforded meager rights and those who were afforded none, the migrant workers. My analysis will focus on key apartheid legislation which allowed for effective influx control of blacks into urban white Cape Town, the suppression of black resistance and disunion of South African Blacks. I will explore in depth Crossroads, Cape Town’s informal housing camp for migratory black labor and its growth into a powerful squatter settlement that defied the very government which originally sanctioned it. When in 1983, the apartheid state tried to

---

eradicate this eyesore by transferring these squatters to the newly formed black township, Khayelitsha, they faced strong resistance. Eventually in 1986, they resorted to colluding with black Crossroads “mayor” and strongman Johnson Nxbobongwana to attack his own squatter camps and violently purge the Crossroads, leaving no other option for displaced residents but to move to Khayelitsha.

To fully grasp the conflict that erupted in the summer of 1986 between rival black factions, something that the state washed their hands of and conveniently termed “black on black violence,” a triad of systems must be explored. As such, the impact of the apartheid government’s pass system which distinguished between “legal” and “illegal” blacks must be examined. This pass system required all Black South Africans to carry passbooks, which among other things, denoted if it were legal or illegal for that individual to be in a certain area. Intrinsically, the apartheid pass system initiated internal black separatism. Government pass book and counter-insurgency sweeps were primary to the military presence in the Crossroads squatter settlements that summer. The Crossroads slum had sprung up on the periphery of Cape Town in the 1970’s originally at the direction of local authorities to meet the black labor housing crisis. However, later when authorities tried to remove the shantytown, it had rooted itself firmly through the help of white liberal organizations, emerging as united symbol of resistance against the apartheid government. Provincial and state authorities found a fissure in their perceived unity and utilized it for their own purposes. Internal Crossroads harmony had begun to splinter into two rival factions which were the old Crossroads leaders, the Witdoeke, led by Nxbobongwana and those who threatened usurpation, the new Comrades, militant youths backed by the African National Congress who challenged Witdoeke corruption. Through the arming and protection of
Ngxobongwana and his Witdoeke movement against the Comrades, the state again resorted to its “divide and rule” strategy to accomplish its goal of settling Khayelitsha.

Shortly following the Witdoeke-Comrade infighting that burned most of the settlement to the ground, Ngxobongwana discussed the violence at Crossroads in a September 1986 interview. While he himself denied any involvement in initiating the Witdoeke attacks, an assertion we know to be untrue as uncovered in the post-apartheid 1997 Truth Commission investigation, he did allude to the fact that anti-apartheid Comrades were unwanted in Crossroads, because they were bringing police activity into his settlement.\(^3\) This allegation provides basis for the argument that apartheid acts which militarized both pass and counter-insurgency sweeps must be examined as a driver for the violence. On July 24, 1986, the South African government lifted the requirement to carry passbooks, but unfortunately this came one month too late for those who endured unprecedented bloodshed at Crossroads in May and June of 1986. In addition to pass legislation, black anti-apartheid resistance movements and military police collusion with the Black African Witdoeke movement will also be scrutinized as part of the triad of mechanisms which led to the Crossroads massacre and the subsequent compulsory transfer of its residents to Khayelitsha. To illuminate this, I will examine a number of key acts of legislation as well as the formation of political alliances and the mass displacement of Black South Africans into segregated townships or tribal based homelands, called Bantustans.

In part one, spanning from 1948 to 1960, I scrutinize a series of early apartheid legislation, including three cornerstone 1950’s acts: the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the Suppression of Communism Act. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government

Act of 1959, further refined separatism in apartheid politics, by creating 10 Bantu homelands called Bantustans. I specifically examine the division of the black population into urban Africans and migrant workers whose primary residence were in the Bantustans. Part two, spanning 1961 to early 1983, will trace the ban and formation of anti-apartheid parties such as the militant African National Congress which was exiled in 1960 and the pacifist United Democratic Front which was established in 1983. I will argue that national politics and their resistance movements are critical for understanding the violence that emerged at Crossroads as well. The 1970’s development of the Crossroad squatter settlement on the urban periphery as a symbolic defiance of the apartheid government will be discussed in this section, as well as alliances formed between anti-apartheid movements and corrupt slum leaders. In part three, spanning from late 1983 to 1986, I explore the initial apartheid urban planning of Khayelitsha and difficulties the government faced in transferring Crossroads residents there. I will then pivot to scrutinize the state’s urban development as well as the military police support of Crossroad squatter settlement leader Johnson Ngxobongwana and the control they exerted over him. The divisions between Black African factions culminating in the 1986 Witdoeke massacres directed by Ngxobongwana in opposition to the Comrades, the urban guerrilla units of the African National Congress will finally be examined. This “black on black violence” left over 60 dead and 60,000 homeless, forcing the remaining unwilling residents of Crossroads to move to the place they had initially resisted- Khayelitsha.

Much of the historiography used to explain the clash at Crossroads focuses on the government’s role in aiding the Witdoeke, but neglects to substantiate the role that apartheid’s pass structure had in the division between groups of Black Africans. While the collusion between the police and the Witdoeke cannot be ignored, the national politics of the pass system and its
divisionary principles must also be acknowledged in concert with resistance movements. The militarized laws of apartheid drove a wedge between the papered and the non-papered Black Africans—those who could legally reside in an area and those who could not. As urban blacks were separated from migratory blacks or those not allowed at all to be in a prescribed area, friction grew between these groups. In general, those who had less freedoms became more radicalized against the state while those granted meager privileges became more conservative. It was in this context with mounting pass and counter-insurgency sweeps that the “black on black violence” erupted that fateful summer in Crossroads.⁴

**Part One: 1948-1960 The Role Apartheid Legislation Had in the Division of Black South Africans**

Since the arrival of Europeans, South Africa has been the seat of segregationist policies and the separation of ethnicities, be it of indigenous tribes or even between white groups of the British and the Dutch Afrikaans. Apartheid as it was coined from the Afrikaner word for “apartness,” officialized with the 1948 Nationalist Party election of Daniel Malan who codified a series of key legislation which signaled the rejection of the more moderate United Party and the rise of the Afrikaner far right extremism, laying firm its foundation.⁵ Beginning with the Population Registration Act of 1950, which called for the identification and registration into one of four distinct racial groups, apartheid became fully entrenched in South Africa. These groups were white, coloured, native/Bantu (blacks indigenous to Africa) or other which came later to denote Asian, meaning Indian or Pakistani. Whites were people of European origins, excluding

---

those of mixed origin, while coloureds came to represent the diversified population of “all other people.”

Every South African was assigned an identity number as well as a category by Local Race Classification Boards. Determination of category was based on a series of imprecise racial tests, including assessing a person’s skin color, facial features, hair, home language and knowledge of Afrikaans, the area where the person lived, their friends, employment, eating and drinking habits as well as their socioeconomic status.

In the event that authorities could not distinguish conclusively that a person was white, they would employ the “pencil in hair test.” A pencil was put in the person’s hair and if it did not drop, the person was deemed coloured. The imprecise application of this law could divide families, where parents could be determined white, while their offspring were classified as coloured. Another testament to its imprecision was the routine reclassification of people who challenged their original cataloguing. Much of this reclassification shifted those determined to be black, to the coloured group, which as we shall see, granted more rights to the individual. It was, however, this assignment of each member of the South African population to a specified group that paved the path for a legally enforceable program of residential segregation, which was crystalized in the Group Areas Act.

The Group Areas Act of 1950, profoundly shaped the apartheid model of urbanity, with its commercial city center, transitional mixed-uses areas and slummed outskirts where Black

---


Africans would squat after fleeing the Bantustans. The Bantustans, or “tribal homelands” were the prescribed area for all blacks who did not have government authorization to be in urban or otherwise white areas. The acts goals were racial segregation and controlling the influx of blacks entering prescribed areas. It imposed control over the ownership of land and delineated specifically where each racial group member could live as determined by their classification in the Population Registration Act. Prime urban, industrial and agricultural areas were given to whites, with blacks restricted from entry into these zones unless granted permission by the state. Desirable urban land values grew and became progressively more segregated, as Black Africans were uprooted from the city center into their designated hinterland Bantustans. Mike Davis in his masterpiece, *Planet of Slums*, aptly notes the problem with the dystopian apartheid city:

“Ultimately, this ideal of ‘white cities, black homelands’ collided with the labor-market needs of big capital as well as the heroic resistance of its victims.”

This was seen as urbanization and industrialization increased the need for blacks to be close to the city to provide cheap labor for whites. As Davis suggests, “heroic resistance” came in the form of informal black settlements and squatter camps which sprang up and rooted themselves on the outskirts of metropolises, such as the Cape’s infamous Crossroads settlement. While Cape Town initially resisted the Group Areas Act, by 1957, the City Council began its implementation and did so with a vengeance, making it one of the most segregated cities by the time of the collapse of apartheid.

The Pass Laws Act of 1952 codified the existing passbook practices into legislature and thereby gave the apartheid government a means to enforce their radicalized racial segregation.

---

All Black Africans over the age of 16 were required to carry a pass book, known as a dompas, which contained information such as their photograph, fingerprints, employment details, permission from the government to be in a particular region, qualifications to work or seek work in specified areas as well as employer’s reports of worker performance and behavior. White attorney Joel Carlson, who fought for the rights of Black Africans in the 70’s, stated the following:

“The document known as a pass has changed only in form during the 150 years since it was first introduced by whites. The pass laws were designed to channel the flow of Africans who left their homes to seek work through government labor centers. Today, Africans are even referred to in government circulars and by white government ministers as productive or non-productive labor units serving the white economy…No African can work or go anywhere or remain anywhere without his pass…Failure to produce a pass on demand, a pass clearly showing compliance with the law, results in immediate arrest and imprisonment.”

Employers wielded power over their black employees as they could decline to endorse their dompas, making it illegal for them to remain in the area. Government officials, as well, through a practice known as “endorsing out” possessed the power to expel blacks by adverse endorsements in their pass book without providing any reason. “Endorsing out” forfeited the rights not only of the worker, but of all his family members to remain in the area. This served the apartheid government well in its “divide and rule” strategy, by even dividing Black Africans into those who could legally be in an area and those who could not. Michael Savage, Professor of Sociology at the University of Cape Town, points to the fact that pass laws and the ability for authorities to “endorse out” any Black African they so choose without reason, were effective also.

---


as a political weapon against black dissidents, something which would be practiced frequently in the 70’s and 80’s.\textsuperscript{16}

The apartheid regime’s pass system created a sophisticated system of both influx control and structural violence against Black Africans. The policy of influx control guaranteed the number of blacks be kept to the minimum necessary for economic purposes so as to prevent the blacks close to the city center from outnumbering whites. This was enforced through structural violence.\textsuperscript{1} Structural violence was manifested and endorsed by the cumulative police and military’s subjugation and force against Black South Africans in the name of law and order and the enforcement of dompas legislature to curtail excessive black movement from the Bantustans.

Influx control into the city center was not the only purpose that passbook laws served, although the control of movement and the circumscription of access to work by whites was critical.\textsuperscript{17} Pass laws also served to separate Black Africans along both tribal lines and between urban and migrant workers in order to decrease their political power which was critical to maintaining white domination.\textsuperscript{18} Those who did not have access via their dompas to the urban centers, such as Cape Town, were banished to the Bantustans, or “homelands” as the apartheid government inaccurately labeled them. These were regions in the hinterlands, the nearest being over 500 miles away from the Western Cape. Most blacks then, were residentially segregated by vast distances and only permitted to enter municipal areas for the purpose of providing labor to whites. It was the men primarily who were granted migrant labor status, which translated into

one-year renewable contracts, in the Western Cape. Employers provided male-only hostels in Cape Town as it was the official apartheid policy to neither permit nor build family housing.¹⁹ Men would need to leave their families behind in the Bantustans while they worked in the metropolis. The remoteness of the Bantustans, however, created a problem for the apartheid regime who could not entirely control migrant workers families nor other non-permitted Black Africans to the urban surrounds. Poverty and deteriorated conditions due to lack of proper infrastructure and sanitation abounded in the Bantustans which brought many illegal work-seekers to the Cape.²⁰ As well, shortages of migrant worker housing coupled with the denial of family rights, led to a mass squatter movement in Cape Town and the squatter settlement which would later be known as Crossroads began to grow.²¹ Reporter Alan Cowell of the New York Times interviewed one resident, from the Transkei Bantustan who had relocated to Crossroads, for want of something better:

“In Transkei,” Mrs. Gwentshi said, "there are no jobs, no money, the cost of living is high." Her husband has found work in Cape Town, she said, "and it is important to be with your husband.”²²

However, as historian Arnold Isaacs notes in his exposé on the rise and fall of Crossroads, the Cape Town City Council was “extremely unhappy with the flow of ‘illegal’ Africans into town.”²³

---

The delicate balance of needing cheap urban labor and blacks to provide it, as well as the requisite to maintain racial segregation and eliminate blacks from the city center proved a challenge for the apartheid government. Pass laws, however, aided the government in these opposing needs regarding the Black South African population and for a while effectively controlled black employment, housing, land and citizenship rights. The government’s need to exclude blacks from white areas was not only for purposes of racial segregation, but also in order to maintain political superiority. Paradoxically, they needed to devise a way to include this population so as to ensure a steady supply of cost-effective labor. Michael Savage, has noted that pass laws were more inclusionary in nature up to 1950, while after that and until the dismantling of the apartheid system, they veered to the exclusionary, with the goal being to push Black South Africans from white areas and contain them within the Bantustans.\textsuperscript{24} The state found a way to accomplish both goals in the Coloured Labour Preference Policy which effectively replaced many Black South Africans with Coloured South Africans, who likewise would provide reduced rate labor. According to S. B. Bekker in his Institute of Social and Economic Research Development Study:

“A series of regulations, particular to the Western Cape, are applied with the object of restricting the number of blacks resident in the region; denying blacks permanent rights of sojourn in the region; restricting the scope of employment for blacks in the region; and favouring coloured above black work-seekers throughout the region. In short, the policy aims to replace black by coloured labour and thereby aims to reduce to a minimum the number of blacks in the region.”\textsuperscript{25}

By the mid 1950’s, this Coloured Labour Preference Policy was initiated as a strategy to keep blacks out of Cape Town’s labor force.

Additional labor regulations were further introduced to effectively eliminate Black Africans from the Western Cape by ending their contracts and thereby terminating their pass rights. The legislation stipulated:

“If an employer wishes to employ an African, he is required to obtain a coloured labour preference clearance certificate from the Department of Manpower, stating that no suitable coloured person is available to fill the position.”

This did not deter all blacks, however, and as both black and coloured workers settled on the outskirts of Cape Town to provide urban labor, their squatter camps became segregated as well. While the government was willing to provide housing for coloured workers, they deported the black population to the Bantustans, utilizing pass violations as the basis. This policy in conjunction with black persistence to not leave, led to the steady increase of pass law arrests and prosecutions. Apprehensions reached their apex in the late sixties and early seventies, where pass law violations reached upward of three million per annum, although as Savage aptly notes, statistics coming from within the apartheid government were highly unreliable.

Several other acts decisively entrenched apartheid in practice and disallowed for any form of resistance against it, empowering the state’s military police to enforce segregationist policies. The 1950 Suppression of Communism Act defined “communism” as

“any doctrine or scheme... which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union ... by unlawful acts or omissions or by the threat of such acts or omissions ... or under the guidance of any foreign or international institution.”

---

Communism, under this broad definition, was anything that opposed apartheid. The Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act No 15 of 1954 then sanctioned the state “to prohibit listed persons from being members of specific organizations or from attending gatherings of any description without giving them the opportunity of making representations in their defense or furnishing reasons.”

This dealt a harsh blow to anti-apartheid parties such as the African National Congress as the state could determine who could or could not become members. Furthermore, the government was "authorized to prohibit any particular gathering or all gatherings, in any public place for specified periods". It included the ability “to ban publications deemed to incite hostility between groups and thus could be used to ban publications which tried to bring about social change.” As well as liberation movements, then, any political writings against apartheid, could simply be branded “Communist” and were immediately outlawed. As we shall see, this act was an important precursor to the later Unlawful Organizations Act which would seal the fate of the African National Congress and suppress its activity for over a decade.

The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 would define land planning and separate development policies of the apartheid government. This act created ten overcrowded Bantustans, which cumulatively relegated blacks to less than fifteen percent of South African land, despite being the majority population. The Bantustan homelands formed were Ciskei, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Gazankulu, KwaZulu, Lebow, KwaNdebele, KaNgwane and

---


By creating Bantustans, the apartheid government’s “divide and rule” strategy was further solidified. In the separation of Black South Africans along ten tribal lines, the all-white government could deny any black majority and maintain division so that blacks could not unify into one nationalist organization. Under the guise of “self-government” every Black African was determined to be a citizen of one of these Bantustans, where they would enjoy “full political rights” within their hinterland “homes,” but would be excluded from national politics and the metropolis. Millions of blacks were consolidated on the poorest land, forcibly removed from urban centers as well as prime rural farmlands which were sold at rock bottom prices to white farmers. The Bantustan policy and the structural violence it perpetuated, was carried out against the will and interests of all Black South Africans, relocating most to impoverished tribal areas that were largely unknown to them or that they had little to no previous contact with. These “separate developments” had minimal services, provisions or infrastructure for the populations being forcibly displaced there. The mass removal of economically non-productive blacks from white urban areas and the shifting of the economic and social problems of unemployment, poverty and overcrowding from city centers to the Bantustans were the act’s ramifications. Public housing for this relocated black segment was marked by a lack of integration into the urban centers, diverting them to the cheap and undesirable hinterlands. Most importantly, this system created a division between migrant and urban Black Africans, who in limited numbers were permitted to reside in the metropolis. Blacks were prohibited from staying in urban areas for more than 72 hours, unless classified as “section tenners” which was based on whether or not

---

they were born there and how long they had resided in the area. These “section tenners” or urban Africans were few in number. The primary aim of Bantustan statues were to bolster and preserve white political and economic interests by creating a division between urban Africans and migrant workers. Black migrants were not afforded any rights and were used solely to supply white businesses with cut-rate labor, until they could later be replaced by coloured workers.

The goal to keep Black South Africans divided and not allowed to unite, was critical to the apartheid government. The Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960, gained its power from the earlier Suppression of Communism Act and according to the Nelson Mandela organization, was “rushed through both houses of Parliament and introduced to enable the banning of the African National Congress.” Just as the diversionary tactics of the Bantustans and the separation of urban blacks from migratory workers was important to South African politics, so too was the inability to allow Black Africans to come together to form a successful resistance movement.

Part Two: 1961- Early 1983 The Fall and Rise of Black Resistance- Crossroads Emerges as a Symbolic Representation of Resistance

The Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960 and its banning of the critical black liberation movement of the African National Congress, quelled opposition to the apartheid government outwardly for the following decade. Although the ANC was driven underground and quieted for a time, the exiled organization began forming its militant wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe or “Spear of the Nation” (known as MK) in 1961. Its resistance was directed at the sabotage of government

36 Kim Wale, South Africa’s Struggle to Remember: Contested memories of squatter resistance in the Western Cape. (London: Routledge, 2016), 22.

facilities.\footnote{\textit{1960. Unlawful Organizations Act No 24 or 34} The O’Malley Archives, accessed November 13, 2021, \url{https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01828/05lv01829/06lv01902.htm}} The 1970’s gave rise to a younger generation of united black objectors, drawing inspiration from global activism, particularly neighboring uprisings in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Their actions became increasingly violent, including targeted killings and bombings of military and government structures.\footnote{Arnold Isaacs, “Crossroads: the Rise and Fall of a Squatter Movement in Cape Town, South Africa,” in \textit{Urban Social Movements in the Third World}, ed. Frans Schuurman and Ton Van Naerssen (Florence: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 109.} This younger generation was both militant and politically conscious and did not shun guerrilla actions in favor of peaceful protests. As such, they would no longer be deterred or suppressed by the apartheid government and effectively organized themselves, regularly engaging in violent confrontations at every level of organization including both the local and national levels, manifesting as community, university and political rally uprisings.\footnote{Arnold Isaacs, “Crossroads: the Rise and Fall of a Squatter Movement in Cape Town, South Africa,” in \textit{Urban Social Movements in the Third World}, ed. Frans Schuurman and Ton Van Naerssen (Florence: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 105.}

This Black Consciousness movement and its defiance coincided with the rising need for cheap labor from economic expansion in the Western Cape in the late 1960’s to early 1970’s. As the government relaxed influx control slightly to accommodate the labor need that coloured populations could not sufficiently fill, they refused to provide adequate housing and allowed Black Africans only migrant passes, with their permanent residence and families left behind in the Bantustans. Of these, Ciskei and Transkei were the Bantustan closest to the Cape, yet over 500 miles away as the crow flies, making it an impossible distance to travel to see family. These migrant workers had no legal status as urban dwellers and began to self-house in the peri-urban informal squatter settlements outside of industrialized Cape Town, which by the mid 70’s became known as Crossroads. Alan Cowell, from the New York Times noted,
“Armed with a little ingenuity, a person who wishes to live here, albeit unlawfully, in a slum called Crossroads, can construct a home of wooden planks, fiberboard and green or black plastic sheeting in about three hours.”

The migratory population did just that, squatting in the bush just off the main roads, in the Crossroads slum later at the direction of the Divisional Council, who was in charge of the land, and the Bantu Administration Board, who oversaw Black African affairs. These governmental agencies not only allowed but encouraged this, making squatters register so they could keep track of them to later evict the surplus black population back to the Bantustans.

Civil unrest and economic recession abruptly hit South Africa in the 1970’s. That coupled with the rise of Black consciousness in the young militant activists eventually led the Crossroads squatter settlement to become a symbol of defiance against the apartheid government. The residents entrenched themselves in the settlement and formed a systematized resistance to eviction that proved too great a challenge for apartheid authorities. Despite numerous police pass raids, arrests and deportations to the Bantustans, residents organized themselves and sought the advice and support from liberal white organizations. These organizations intermediated between the squatters and government officials, so as to obtain permanent residence for them in the Crossroads. Crossroads became a Black African social movement by 1976 and with the aid of white progressives, such as the Black Sash, an anti-apartheid woman’s activist group and the non-profit lawyers at the Athlone District Advice Office, was able to overcome the Cape Town Divisional Council’s attempts to eradicate the settlement.

---


43 Kim Wale, South Africa’s Struggle to Remember: Contested memories of squatter resistance in the Western Cape. (London: Routledge, 2016), 25.
that Crossroads be regarded as a protected emergency camp and the Divisional Council was ordered to provide basic water and sanitation to the squatters.\textsuperscript{44} According to the Black Sash newsletter in August of 1976, Die Swart Serp:

“The Council has declared Crossroads an emergency camp, four days after their application had been dismissed by the Magistrate. Crossroads has been granted a reprieve, basic facilities will be installed and for a while, at least, a measure of peace will come to Crossroads.”\textsuperscript{45}

With reluctant support and infrastructure from the government, the residents themselves formed several committees to self-govern their encampment. One was the homeguards and the other was the wardsmen. The homeguards acted to police the settlement so as to prevent crime, while the wardsmen were charged with settling disputes and collecting funds for community needs.\textsuperscript{46}

Together, they became known as the Committee, and although informal, operated as authority within the Crossroads and were recognized by officials. Eventually the Committee was charged with regulating the use of land and collecting fees or rents for land and services.

While the Cape Town Divisional Council was barred from using physical force such as bulldozing to destroy the Crossroads settlement due to its legal status as a protected emergency camp, the military and state police were empowered to eradicate any perception of insurrection in light of mounting student protests and uprisings in Cape Town. Nearby illegal squatter settlements that did not enjoy the same legal protection as Crossroads, were demolished under the guise of protection against insurgency. Those who lived in these razed communities flooded


into Crossroads, giving military and police the right to invade Crossroads in search of the “illegal” fleeing refugees. These raids, under the pretext of removing criminal elements and political dissidents, combined with pass sweeps grew increasingly common in the “protected” settlement of Crossroads.

The torture and mysterious death of black activist and president of the South African Student’s Organization, Steve Biko, in police custody would prove to be the inciting incident to bring the black struggle as well as the Crossroads struggle to the forefront of international media. As reported by The Guardian in an article entitled “How Steve Biko Set a Revolutionary Ball Rolling:

“The destruction of the present oppressive regime in South Africa will require the combination of many forces. Steve Biko was big enough to acknowledge this. He did not see Black Consciousness as the only solution, but neither was he prepared to import a ready-made political ideology.”

This editorial was one of many to bring to international view the tyrannical South African ruling body and the rise of Black Consciousness as one factor that could end apartheid. As well as creating a global outcry, it fueled the underground African National Congress to arm themselves and mobilize guerrilla units, which escalated following Biko’s death. The apartheid government responded in turn by targeting known ANC leaders and increasing pass and counter-insurgency raids.

---


Within South Africa, the government exercised their right via the Suppression of Communism Act to shut down the daily newspaper The World. But even they could not stop the international news and media attention which ultimately pressured the South African government into making slight concessions. The state opened negotiations with the unofficial Crossroads Committee members who pushed for not only infrastructure but a guarantee of legal status to all current residents. The government refused but did agree to build a new Crossroads settlement. However, they denied granting any written guarantees for settlement rights. Without written agreements, the housing at the Crossroads would always remain precarious. Despite negotiations with the Crossroads squatters, the apartheid regime remained steadfast in its goal of structural violence which “forced hundreds of thousands of Black South Africans into informal housing on land they had no legal claim to.” Furthermore, the state would also maintain the upper hand in getting the Committee to agree to work in conjunction with the governmental Bantu Administration Board to survey residents in determination of who would qualify to live in the new Crossroads.

It was during this time when internal power struggles between Crossroads Committee members began to surface. Out of these conflicts, the replacement “Executive Committee” arose. This new Executive Committee colluded with the Bantu Administration Board in falsifying resident permits, which provided a convenient excuse for the government to delay issuing any

---


new permits. In addition, they shortened the length of permits granted from 18 months to 3 months, making many of the residents “illegal” once those permits expired. In 1980, Crossroads became divided into Old Crossroads and New Crossroads which as well fractured the Executive Committee along these same lines. This created more friction between Black African squatter leaders, who were all competing for resources and power by aligning themselves with powerful outside actors. While one actor was the banned ANC and its guerilla units, another actor was the newly formed non-racial and pacifist United Democratic Front, a coalition of civic, church, students and workers united to fight and abolish apartheid. The UDF was a reaction to the adoption of a new South African tricameral constitution which was inclusionary of white, coloured and Asian South Africans, but still exclusionary of Black South Africans. Peaceful in nature, the UDF promoted boycotts and protests and looked down on the violent tactics of the armed ANC’s guerrilla units as well as its standard practice of government sabotage. The ANC aligned with the Black Consciousness Movement which would only allow black leaders and participants, whereas the UDF was racially inclusive, welcoming anyone who would share in their goal of ending apartheid. These decidedly different liberation movements would come to back shantytown leaders, in rapidly expanding squatter settlements.

By the early 1980’s, it was estimated that forty percent of the Western Cape squatters were illegal. Despite continuous pass raids, arrests and prosecutions, the government was fighting a losing battle in deporting blacks to the Bantustans. It needed a new strategy, and that strategy was called Khayelitsha. Khayelitsha would afford a compromised solution by providing

Black South Africans with their own segregated township closer to the Cape, yet far enough away to maintain separation.

**Part Three: Late 1983-1986 Urban Planning and Khayelitsha's Bloody Origins**

In 1983, the apartheid government announced plans to establish Khayelitsha as a township for Black Africans. It was meant to contain and consolidate all legal Black Africans in the Western Cape, diverting them from the peri-urban slum of Crossroads, which was proving difficult to eradicate. Due to its remote and undesirable location, however, both central and provincial government leaders faced extreme resistance in relocating the squatters. Khayelitsha can be viewed as one of the apartheid government’s final attempts at the enforcement of the 1950’s Group Areas Act, maintaining racial division and ridding the Western Cape of its overcrowded squatter settlements which were expanding due to the influx of hinterland blacks.  

In a description of this new township, New Statesman reporter Anthony Robinson wrote, “the tiny breeze-block houses of only 27 square metres stretch into the distance, like lines of large dog kennels.” Khayelitsha’s cramped urban structure did not differ from previous overcrowded apartheid black townships, which were designed to house at minimal costs cheap migrant labor. Dr. Piet Koornhof, Minister of Co-Operation and Development announced in July of 1983 that all of Cape Town’s legal blacks would be housed in the segregated township of the newly formed Khayelitsha, over 25 miles away from the metropolis. Reporter Barry Streek quoted George Morrison, Deputy Minister of Cooperation, in an address to the Cape Congress of the

---


National Party, “Crossroads is a symbol of provocation and defiance of the government, and we want to destroy that symbolism at all costs.”  

The government, Streek further reported, “is now determined that the ‘legal’ residents in Crossroads must move to a new township, Khayelitsha, some 25 miles from Cape Town.”  

Initially, Khayelitsha had a minimal number of structured tenements, with the majority of “housing” to be “site and service plots,” which was bare land with limited services of water and sanitation. The state then, in seeking to relocate the legal Crossroads residents to segregated Cape Peninsula Khayelitsha, used the project to legitimize informal settlements with squatter site-and-service plots as a solution to the problem of black housing. The remaining illegal residents were to be deported back to the Bantustans.

What was novel about Khayelitsha, however, was that up until its formation, the Council had granted only a limited number of Black Africans the right to reside in the Western Cape, excluding most with the Coloured Labour Preference Act. Now the state agreed to rescind the Coloured Labour Preference Policy so that “legal” Black South Africans could be employed in the Western Cape. Historian Gillian P. Cook, questions whether this was indeed a real change in apartheid policy or simply the only feasible solution to overcrowding, failing forced removals and escalating violence. Unprecedented violence and forced removals would come later. Aside

---


from allowing blacks residence in the Western Cape, however, Khayelitsha was a typical apartheid black township, never intended to be an independent and viable city.⁶³

As a 3,220 hectare site, its first development track was designed to house 30,000 squatters without giving any rights to land. In light of rioting and refusals to move, the government almost immediately began offering 99 year leaseholds.⁶⁴ By relocating Crossroads residents to Khayelitsha, the Cape’s growing black working class could be consolidated into a peri-urban area large enough to contain them all, ridding Cape Town of their presence.⁶⁵ As well as temporary site-and-service plots for controlled squatting in informal housing, it had planned areas for core public dormitory housing and higher-income private housing, a central area, educational, community, social service areas and a planned railway for commuting to Cape Town.⁶⁶ The site-and-service plots were provided with shared piped water and sewage systems with outdoor bucket toilets, however the truly informal squatter areas were allocated no services at all.⁶⁷ Neither medical facilities nor firefighting services were initially planned for Khayelitsha and they would not come into existence until the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. As well, local employment and sufficient formal shops were not considered by urban planners. Instead they provided residents with a “commercial complex” of 4 shops, a mini market, a post office and a bank.⁶⁸ At that time, Crossroads, on the other hand, housed 29,000 occupants with 116

---

businesses to serve residents. Khayelitsha was never planned to be a self-sufficient community but merely a dumping ground to house Black African laborers out of sight from Cape Town.

Squatters did not want to beextricated from Crossroads, which was close to work and medical services. They made their dissent known by demonstrating and sending community representatives to voice their concerns. This did not deter the Western Cape Development Board and the Community Council however, and the building of Khayelitsha continued as squatter harassment through pass raids and arrests were amped up. When rumors of a forced removal began to circulate, rioting broke out and unrest intensified. By late 1984, the government, desperate to settle Khayelitsha, agreed to let “illegal” Cape Town blacks build shacks on the site-and-service plots. Formal housing construction was completed in March of 1985 and by the middle of that year, 1740 legal families moved into core housing while 30,500 squatter families had relocated from Crossroads to occupy the entirety of site-and-service plots available.

Already, Khayelitsha was overpopulated for the infrastructure that it was provided.

But overpopulation meant nothing to the government whose goal was to move most, if not all of the Crossroads residents to Khayelitsha. Crossroads, in fact, suffered from a far greater overcrowding problem, but most of its residents still refused to relocate. Crossroads strongman turned “mayor” Johnson Ngxobongwana and Oliver Memani worked together to form the United Crossroads Committee which facilitated discussions with the Minister of Cooperation and Development. The newly formed United Democratic Front, in an effort to be supportive of squatter communities, formed an alliance with Ngxobongwana and the United Crossroads

---

Committee. By late 1983, however, conflicts over who qualified to be a Crossroads resident and who would have to relocate to Khayelitsha began to surface between Ngxobongwana and Memani. As they did not agree on who would be permitted to stay in Crossroads, two different factions emerged.\(^7^1\) Disagreements intensified as more and more “illegal” squatters poured into the protected Crossroads settlement after the militarized police razed housing in nearby unprotected shantytowns. As Cape Town reporter, Dot Cleminshaw aptly noted:

“In a situation of oppression, where conditions simply do not exist for democratic elections, unrepresentative and frustrated leadership slides easily into authoritarianism and corruption, whether the leaders are councilors or squatter camp heads, whether black or white.”\(^7^2\)

It was not surprising then when in December of 1983, violence erupted as a number of Memani supporters were injured, killed and their homes burnt down by the Ngxobongwana faction. This was just a precursor of what would come. Some shanty town residents contested corruption by Ngxobongwana, citing favoritism and the lavish rewarding of his henchmen with salaries, community cars and bail money using their “community” dollars.\(^7^3\) However, the Crossroads association representing those residents became limited as a result of threats and home bombings of those opposed to Ngxobongwana.\(^7^4\) Armed Ngxobongwana’s supporters distinguished themselves by wearing bits of white cloth or “witdoeke,” which was the Afrikaner word that the group took its name from.\(^7^5\) Some Crossroads residents fled to Khayelitsha in an attempt to escape the bloodshed which began that December. Authorities saw this as opportune and under...

---

\(^7^1\) Dot Cleminshaw, “From Crossroads to Khayelitsha to … ?” *Cape Times* (Cape Town, South Africa), Jan 8, 1984, https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files2/ remar85.4.pdf

\(^7^2\) Dot Cleminshaw, “From Crossroads to Khayelitsha to … ?” *Cape Times* (Cape Town, South Africa), Jan 8, 1984, https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files2/ remar85.4.pdf


the guise of combatting the violence, began to intervene with their own campaign of slum
clearance and demolition coupled with massive pass arrests that forcibly removed offenders to
the Bantustans.76

By now the Witdoeke had taken over policing the Crossroads, suppressing opposition by
force, something which the pacifist UDF did not condone, yet failed to intervene and repress
sufficiently, thereby leaving a dangerous situation to progressively get worse.77 As violence
increased, in 1985, the youth-driven ANC backed militant organization, known as the
“Comrades” started their own campaign against not only the apartheid state, but against
Ngxobongwana and the Witdoeke, whom they considered to be corrupt. Meanwhile,
Ngxobongwana had been arrested earlier in the year on charges of organizing a rent boycott
against the government. After having only been incarcerated for four months, he emerged from
prison and rescinded his anti-state position, now fully backing the authorities. Many interpreted
this as collusion with the government in return for a reduced sentence. They noted that he had
formed an active alliance with the South African Police and the South African Defense Force.78
It was at this time that the state, now desperate to move both “legal” and “illegal” Crossroads
residents to Khayelitsha, offered 18 month residence permits to those who would move
voluntarily. By September of 1985, although thirty-five thousand squatters had relocated, one
hundred thousand still refused to leave Crossroads.

76 Dot Cleminshaw, “From Crossroads to Khayelitsha to … ?” Cape Times (Cape Town, South Africa), Jan
77 Arnold Isaacs, “Crossroads: the Rise and Fall of a Squatter Movement in Cape Town, South Africa,” in
Urban Social Movements in the Third World, ed. Frans Schuurman and Ton Van Naerssen (Florence: Taylor &
Francis Group, 2011), 114.
78 Arnold Isaacs, “Crossroads: the Rise and Fall of a Squatter Movement in Cape Town, South Africa,” in
Urban Social Movements in the Third World, ed. Frans Schuurman and Ton Van Naerssen (Florence: Taylor &
Francis Group, 2011), 115.
In December of 1985, the young “radical” Comrades, decided to enforce a Black Christmas consumer boycott and severely punished all Crossroads residents who did not participate. This led to intense conflict with the Witdoeke, or “fathers/vigilantes” as they were also known, who took harsh action against the Comrades. The UDF finally withdrew from their alliance with the increasingly violent Ngxobongwana, who, in turn, no longer wanted to be associated with progressive movements that could usurp his power. With the exit of Ngxobongwana, the Comrades then began to be seen as affiliates of the United Democratic Front. As conflict escalated between these rival factions, the police did little to intervene with what they labeled rising “black on black violence,” until the first wave of horror on May 17, 1986. This incident marked a visible alliance between the apartheid state and Ngxobongwana. A few months prior, the state had agreed to develop and upgrade Crossroads to a model urban community, but first they wanted all but 40,000 squatters to be cleared and moved to Khayelitsha. Reporter Allister Sparks notes:

“The accusation is that the leader of the main sector of the squatter complex, called Old Crossroads, has agreed with white authorities to drive out the squatters from a number of satellite camps that have sprung up around the central one. In return, Old Crossroads would be upgraded into a township with improved houses, paved streets and athletic fields.”79

As “mayor” of Crossroads, Ngxobongwana was not only in favor of this upgrade but also wanted any progressive radicals who could threaten his authority removed. Four powerful forces had an interest to clear Crossroads: the state who had been trying to get squatters to move to Khayelitsha, the land developers granted permission and a multi-million dollar budget for development, the police and military in charge of removing squatters and suppressing anti-

Vigil 29

apartheid militant movements, and Johnson Ngxobongwana. Transcripts from the Truth Commission’s Human Rights Violation Hearing which took place in 1997 to investigate the Witdoeke massacre, revealed the following as Truth Commissioner Dr. Ramashala, interrogated Development Boards leader, Mr. Schelhase:

“DR RAMASHALA: Is it correct for me to say that you had a passion for Crossroads?

MR SCHELHASE: Yes Ma'am.

DR RAMASHALA: And that in fact you wanted Crossroads to be developed?

MR SCHELHASE: Absolutely.

DR RAMASHALA: And that in fact you would not have opposed any actions that might have facilitated your agenda to clear the problem areas around Crossroads to enable you to develop it?

MR SCHELHASE: I would not.

DR RAMASHALA: May I say then Sir that your interests, the interests of the security forces and the interests of the Witdoeke verged in a sense?

MR SCHELHASE: Yes, yes.

DR RAMASHALA: And that all three groups would have done anything to make sure that the strategies you engage in facilitated the process. For you the process would be development.

MR SCHELHASE: One could say that.

DR RAMASHALA: For the security forces their goal would be to clear the area of comrades and for the Witdoeke to get rid of the UDF related allies etc?

MR SCHELHASE: Yes Ma'am.”

As these mighty influences converged, the blood at Crossroads flowed. According to New York Times reporter, Alan Cowell:

“Huge palls of black smoke blotted out the sun over Crossroads last week as the vigilantes, known in Afrikaans as 'witdoeke' after the strips of white cloth they wear for identification purposes, clashed with the radicals, known here as 'the comrades.' The vigilantes set fire to homes as they went. Shots were fired, witnesses said, and in one incident unidentified gunmen ambushed a minibus,

forced it to stop and hacked its five occupants to death. The police and army units patrolling the densely packed area, witnesses said, failed to keep the two sides apart, but intervened on some occasions when it seemed the vigilantes were losing. The security forces vigorously deny taking sides, but an activist cleric, the Rev. Sidney Luckett, said after visiting the camp last week, 'I think the authorities found this as a way of clearing these people out.'”

In an interview, one resident described what happened to her when she and others were taken to a Witdoeke prison that fateful May:

“These men asked if we could see the red sea. This here is the red sea. We looked at it and when we looked we saw the heads of people, the necks were severed from the body. The heads were on the one side and the bodies on the other side. They were floating in the water. They said the best thing was to take us to Ngxobongwana.”

The May 1986 attack of the Witdoeke left thirty thousand homeless, forcing them to move to Khayelitsha when law enforcement barbed-wired off the remnants of their burned shacks, not allowing them to rebuild. Authorities refused to restrain the vigilante Witdoeke because they suited the government’s purpose of transferring the Crossroads population to Khayelitsha.

Cowell reports:

“The Government's critics assert that by using the vigilantes as surrogates, the authorities are seeking to achieve by force what could not be done by persuasion. For years the white authorities have sought to persuade Crossroads residents to move to a new settlement 10 miles away called Khayelitsha, but few have agreed to go.”

In fact, historian Arnold Isaacs alleges that not only did the state turn a blind eye to the Witdoeke/Comrade escalating violence, but that it “cleverly aggravated relations between rival groups by eagerly aiding and abetting the leadership of its choice, which in this case was that of

---


82 The Agenda Network, “Witdoeke Vigilantes of Crossroads,” July 30, 2021, video, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8xIXxANyjKw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8xIXxANyjKw).

the more conservatively inclined Witdoeke.”

In addition to sealing off destroyed portions of Crossroads, the May 1986 Witdoeke bloodbath gave an excuse for the South African army and police to increase pass and counter-insurgency raids. According to Isaacs,

“This marked the start of one of the most brutal acts of destruction and forced removals that South Africa has ever experienced. The Witdoeke were engaged by the South African Police and South African Defense Force to do most of their dirty work.”

The government clearly benefited from the Witdoeke violence although they denied knowledge or involvement in the massacre. One possible cause that has been identified as the impetus for the Crossroads cleansing was the killing of nine of Ngxobongwana’s men by Comrades. This was followed by two police being slain in Crossroads satellite camps, which led to numerous pass and counter-insurgency raids in the settlement. It was at this time that the Witdoeke and South African police and military are thought to have secretly joined forces. One thing that is certain is that the government gained from this “black on black violence” and was quick to bulldoze the burnt shanties in the aftermath. As reported in the Washington Post after the May Witdoeke attacks:

“Last week’s fighting at the Crossroads shantytown between conservative and left-wing factions left between 20,000 and 50,000 people homeless. Authorities of the white-led government said they would go ahead with plans to begin bulldozing the area where thousands of shacks were burned.”

---

And so the government was finally able to legally demolish parts of the Crossroads that the Witdoeke had destroyed, something which they had been prohibited to do since the protection the squatter camp had enjoyed from the Black Sash’s legal battle in 1976.

Los Angeles Times Cape Town correspondent, Michael Parks, furthers the argument of the Witdoeke motive of the attacks as the Comrade’s refusal to leave Crossroads which endangered the shantytown by bringing increased police and army patrols to the area. In an interview with a member of the Crossroads Executive Committee, he reports:

“We did not mean to go to war, but we had to respond to the activities of these youths,” said Edward Qhangana, a member of the Crossroads residents’ executive committee under Ngxobongwana. “They may have militancy but they lack political maturity, and this makes them a danger to the whole Crossroads community. They had to go. When they attacked the security forces with their stones and petrol (gasoline) bombs and hand grenades even, we all suffered from the police retribution. Many of these youths were not even from Crossroads families but had fled here from nearby townships to escape the police. Finally, when they started attacking the Crossroads community leaders, we had to protect ourselves, and counterattack to drive them out. The Comrades bear the responsibility for all these deaths and all these people’s misery.”

While Ngxobongwana’s faction cited the threat that the Comrades brought with them into the Crossroads, the Comrades countered with their need to destroy the corrupt Ngxobongwana administration.

“We are against exploitation, and Ngxobongwana’s committee is exploiting the people of Crossroads,” Mxolisis Tolbat, chairman of the Crossroads branch of the Cape Youth Congress, said, emerging briefly from a hiding place outside Crossroads. The committee is not democratic, and lately it has become a tool of the system... They were doing the work of the police, of the system. They were splitting the people in our struggle against apartheid and they had joined the enemy.”

---

Parks alleges that Ngxobongwana had struck a deal with the state to burn down the squatter camps so the residents would have to move to Khayelitsha, in return for arms, police protection and land.\textsuperscript{90}

After the initial 30,000 homeless Crossroads residents from the May attack were sent to Khayelitsha, the remaining 70,000 were attacked and their shanties burned to the ground in the June carnage by hundreds of Witdoeke assisted by South African police and military.\textsuperscript{91} Parks reports in an interview with one Crossroads resident after the second attack:

“First, they came in gangs of 50 and 60 looking for all the Comrades. They were armed to the teeth with spears and clubs and pangas (machetes), and quite a few had rifles and pistols. All the youth had to flee because the Witdoeke clearly intended to kill anyone and everyone they thought might be a Comrade. Some of our young men did get together, and fought back with stones and petrol bombs and whatever weapons they could get. But the Witdoeke had more men and more guns, and whenever the battle turned against them, the police intervened with their tear gas and shotguns against the youth. They began burning our houses late on Sunday, and when they got the upper hand they set fire to everything. Many people saw some policemen even helping the Witdoeke to burn us all out. Of course, we all had to flee for our lives. And then the police and the army put up a barbed-wire fence to prevent us from returning. So there is no doubt in our minds that the Witdoeke were working for the system.”\textsuperscript{92}

The Comrades, despite the political and military support that the ANC had provided them with, had met their match. Again, the state police and military denied any involvement. The Witdoeke in this second round of violence, burned the shanties of another 30,000 people, raising the number of homeless to over 60,000 and the death toll to 60. The Toronto Star AP reported:

“More than 2,000 "white scarves," (Witdoeke) led by half a dozen police armored cars, attacked and drove the defenders off, pursuing them for two hours through


the streets of adjacent black townships. The air was filled with the vigilantes' war cries as they surged forward in their attack, armed with long knives, machetes, spears, iron bars and wooden clubs as well as a large number of rifles and pistols. Mothers, babies on their backs and in their arms, fled with what few possessions they had managed to salvage from their homes. The comrades, a few of whom were armed with AK-47 assault rifles and old pistols, fought a rear-guard action as the residents escaped. So fierce was the fighting when the two groups clashed that skulls were split and arms severed by machete blows. The vigilantes' brutal conquest of the last Crossroads section held by the comrades, who support the outlawed African National Congress in its fight against apartheid, also was a major victory for the minority white government in its decade-long effort to move the squatters farther from Cape Town and end their political militancy."93

There is no question that this was a mass, forced removal which benefited not only Ngxobongwana but the apartheid government.

Johnson Ngxobongwana, in a September 1986 interview, denied any involvement in the Witdoeke attacks of May and June of 1986, citing he was not there but stating that the Comrades were bringing unwelcomed police activity into his community. In an interview with Crossroads residents regarding the massacre, one resident explained why they believed the violence occurred:

“They (the Witdoeke) want to burn this place down because they know that there’s a lot of Comrades here which are fighting against the government. They are being supported, they are given even guns, bullets and everything from the police.”94

Another resident expounded on political motives:

“They are burning down the shanties because he (Ngxobongwana) don’t want anyone associated with any political organization (ANC or UDF) because he wants to be the leader. The problem is that whenever the other group is attacking with the number one side, then they’ve got a police to help them. The police will shoot tear gas and rubber bullets to people.”


The fact that Ngxobongwana and his Witdoeke movement colluded with the police and military to fight against other Crossroads factions cannot be dismissed. When asked what caused the division to a once unified Crossroads, in the September interview, Ngxobongwana denied the fact that the government divided the people and stated that the people in Crossroads divided themselves.95 As we have seen, this could not be further from the truth. Furthermore, Ngxobongwana encouraged the movement of Crossroads residents to Khayelitsha, which he claimed was a beautiful place where “when it is hot, one can swim in the sea.”96 While Ngxobongwana later lost popularity due to his corrupt distribution of housing, working ties with apartheid government, and the development of the witdoeke vigilantes, he remained a key figure in the apartheid government’s divisionary tactics in the settling of Khayelitsha.

Conclusion

The objective of South Africa’s apartheid governmental design was complete segregation and white dominion. By not only separating races into four distinct categories, but by further separating Black South Africans into tribal units, migrant workers and urban blacks, they accomplished their strategy of “divide and rule.” The implementation of key legislation allowed for effective enforcement, suppression of resistance and disunion. To deal with the necessity of cheap labor while maintaining segregation in the Western Cape, the state first implemented the Coloured Labour Preference Act. When industrialization surpassed coloured labor capability, informal housing on the fringe of Cape Town sprang up for migratory black workers, sanctioned

by officials. But out of this, a powerful squatter settlement known as Crossroads emerged as a symbol of defiance of the apartheid government and an eyesore that proved impossible to eradicate, due to aid from white liberal organizations and internal unification. The state thought it could find an easy solution to purge blacks from the outskirts of Cape Town, by settling them 25 miles from the metropolis in the newly formed segregated black township of Khayelitsha. When residents refused to relocate, they utilized their same “divide and rule” strategy to create division amongst the Crossroads squatters. By intensifying pass and counter-insurgency raids in the settlement, pitting strongman Johnson Ngxobongwana and his Witdoeke vigilantes against the anti-apartheid militant Comrades and then colluding with Ngxobongwana, they succeeded. Black on black warfare erupted and one of the bloodiest, horrific mass forced removals ensued. Khayelitsha was founded by bloodshed and today as a product of apartheid urbanity, has grown to be one of the world’s largest slums seeped in its remembered history of carnage.
Works Cited

Primary Sources:


Cleminshaw, Dot. “From Crossroads to Khayelitsha to … ?” Cape Times (Cape Town, South Africa), Jan 8, 1984 https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files2/remar85.4.pdf


Secondary Sources:

https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01828/05lv01829/06lv01840.htm.

https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01828/05lv01829/06lv01861.htm.

https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01828/05lv01829/06lv01902.htm.


---

1 As defined by renowned Harvard Anthropologist, Dr. Paul Farmer:
“Structural violence is one way of describing social arrangements that put individuals and populations in harm’s way… The arrangements are structural because they are embedded in the political and economic organization of our social world; they are violent because they cause injury to people … neither culture nor pure individual will is at fault; rather, historically given (and often economically driven) processes and forces conspire to constrain individual agency.” “Structural Violence | Structural Violence,” accessed November 18, 2021,