

Aryan D'Rozario

Prof. Kent Eaton

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Pakistan's Military Legacies: Army, State, and Nation

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Scholars have long deliberated the successes and failures of nation-states. A preoccupation in the field has been with identifying the root causes of these successes and failures, and whether any trend seems to emerge. Charles Tilly, while studying Europe, has argued summarily that “war makes state,” and that the modern day European nation-state has survived because of war and conflict, which has produced high levels of state capacity, and cemented its borders and national identities, especially after World War II. Miguel Angel Centeno applies this bellicist, “war makes state” theory to Latin America, arguing that the absence of “total war” has resulted in weak and ineffective Latin American states, where a lack of conflict has resulted in a failure to develop strong national identities and reliable institutions. This paper will attempt to locate Tilly’s and Centeno’s arguments in the context of one Asian case: Pakistan, a country that is similar to many Latin American states, in the sense that Pakistan is a postcolonial country which does not exist in history, and is ethnically diverse. Pakistan also has many European traits, being a former British colony (in the erstwhile British Indian Empire) and experiencing long periods of war and conflict with its neighbours, India and Afghanistan. Neither Tilly nor Centeno attempt to generalize their arguments for all countries in the world, but this paper will try and expand their argument of “war makes state” in a country where the opposite is true. In Pakistan, decades of conflict, both internal and external, has actually resulted in a weak state, with only one powerful institution that has

managed to increase its power and influence, the Pakistan Armed Forces. This paper will examine why the Pakistani military was able to “be the state.” Pakistan’s realities at independence, including a “total war” (a term which will be defined later) a few months later in 1948, gave the military a central role in state building that sustained despite the presence of elected civilian governments. In many ways, Pakistan’s military was the only actor with legitimacy and power. Secondly, Pakistan inherited a post-colonial state with various ethnic and regional tensions that the government and the military failed to address. Despite the experience of three “total” wars (between 1948 and 1971), the mismanagement of ethnic and regional divisions and the historical origins of the military in Pakistan have hindered the development of a strong state.

A Closer Examination of Tilly and Centeno in the Pakistani Context

Tilly argues that the state, and agents of the state, carry on four activities relating to organized violence: (1) war making (elimination of rivals abroad), (2) state making (eliminating rivals at home), (3) protection (protecting the citizens against their enemies), and (4) extraction (acquiring the means to carry out the first three activities). When it comes to Pakistan, we will see that the state has waged war against both external and internal enemies, but in contrast to what Tilly's theory would predict, it has failed to provide for *all* of its citizens and has also failed to extract from its own country, relying instead on foreign donors and charity (181). We shall also see that Pakistan’s powerful military has oftentimes acted unilaterally on (1) and (2), especially during conflicts with India, instead of toeing the line of successive civilian administrations.

Centeno, when discussing Latin America in his work titled, “Blood and Debt” draws distinctions between “limited warfare,” where wars are small and restricted to certain areas, and “total warfare,” when the conflict is larger and more able to extract the complete resources and energy of the state. Centeno writes on the importance of “total war” for state building, arguing that

“total war” can: (1) increase a state’s capacity to extract resources, (2) centralizes power in national capitals which results in a decrease of provincialism, (3) creates a stronger link between the people and their institutions, and increases nationalistic feelings, and (4) gives people a notion of “citizenship” which they can look upto, especially in a new country where that citizenship is not apparent or pre-existing, as was the case in many Latin American countries after their premature independence from the Spanish Empire (Centeno 22). It is useful to perhaps ponder the application of Centeno’s principles to Pakistan, a case which is similar in many ways to Latin America, especially when it comes to mixed populations (ethnicities and religions), a postcolonial state with borders determined by colonial powers, and the creation of a national identity from scratch. Throughout this paper, the reader will see Centeno’s principles discussed in the Pakistani context, especially with regard to Pakistan’s military.

Under Centeno’s definition, Pakistan has had numerous “total wars,” all with the same enemy, India. Limited conflict has also taken place with Afghanistan, although these conflicts will not be the focus of this paper. The 1948 War in Kashmir (less than one year after the creation of the Pakistani state), the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, and the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War in East Pakistan are three major conflicts that can be classified as “total warfare,” especially since the entire state had to be mobilized for these conflicts. Centeno’s bellicist model has certain conditions for a war to be classified as “total” including it being a “mass war,” that gives rise to “geopolitical competition” and that solidifies the “unity of domestic elites, the administration, and a forges a concept of national identity” (23). In Pakistan’s case, all three wars were on a large scale with the mobilization of thousands, and the deployment of total military strength. Villages in Kashmir were razed to the ground, the armies of both India and Pakistan were deployed to all border regions (*not just one*), and the entire province of East Pakistan suffered total destruction in 1971, including

genocide against the Bengali ethnic group at the hands of West Pakistani authorities (Jaffrelot 118). All three wars also caught international attention, prompting backdoor negotiations by the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Nations. The elites in both countries were committed to winning, and upholding ideas of nationhood established in 1947 upon independence. Pakistan remained committed to keeping and annexing Muslim majority regions, while India was keen to show that Kashmir was an integral part of their secular state, and that the concept of a “state based on religion” did not hold, especially in 1971 with the breakaway of Muslim-majority East Pakistan.

Yet, if we look at Pakistan, Tilly’s theory that “war makes state” simply does not hold. These conflicts have not strengthened the state, in fact, they have weakened Pakistan to the extent that many believe it is a “failed state” (Haqqani, *Between Mosque and Military*, Preface). The only institution that has been strengthened is the Pakistan Armed Forces. But there are reasons beyond the idea of “war” that has resulted in these experiences. One factor is provincialism, known to many of us as “federalism,” and the conflict between ethnicity and religion in Pakistan. Before we delve into these factors, it is important to establish some facts about Pakistan as a country.

Pakistan and its Origins

14th August 1947, the day Pakistan was declared an independent dominion of the British Crown, also marked the beginning of a new idea based on religion. The nation-state of Pakistan wasn’t supposed to exist. Pro-Pakistani activists, the most notable being Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, had only conceptualized the idea a few decades prior to 1947, and no one at the time seriously thought that India, a country so large as to merit its own “subcontinent,” would be forever divided on the the lines of religion. The Muslim League, led by Mr. Jinnah, who would later become Pakistan’s first Governor-General, successfully negotiated a separate homeland for India’s Muslims with the British, who found the idea of partition necessary to quell

the increasingly violent divide between India's Hindus and Muslims, and to also appease the Muslim League, a platform that was increasingly seen as "representative" of all Muslims in India. Jinnah would call his future nation-state "Pakistan," an acronym coined by Pakistani nationalist Choudhry Rahmat Ali, standing for multiple ethnic groups and regions: the "P" for Punjab, "A" for Afghans (in the North-West Frontier Provinces), "K" for Kashmir, "I" for the River Indus, "S" for Sindh, and "Tan" for Balochistan (Wolpert, 84). Additionally, the "-istan" suffix means "land" in Arabic and Urdu. It is important to note that all these regions spoke their own language and had their own distinct identities, but they shared Islam as a unifying factor. However, was Islam enough to keep this nation together?

Looking at Pakistan today, Islam is an important part of Pakistani identity. Yet, it hasn't been able to create a stable and strong state, as envisioned by Jinnah and the Muslim League. Why? While I have alluded to ethnic and linguistic tensions, there are many more aspects of this country that were problematic from the very beginning. Warfare is one of those aspects - which resulted in the concentration of "state capacity," the ability of the state to effectively implement decisions, accomplish certain goals, and take action both domestically and in foreign policy, resting in the hands of an all too powerful and *independent* military, at odds with the supposed democratic nature of the state (Skocpol, 1985).

M.A. Jinnah's "Poison of Provincialism"

When India's future leaders committed themselves to federalism in the run-up to Indian independence, Mohammad Ali Jinnah made similar promises for a future Pakistani state. He reneged on these promises when he became Governor-General and Chairman of the Pakistani Constituent Assembly in 1947 (Nazir 115). Jinnah now condemned "*the poison of provincialism*" and amended many earlier resolutions concerning the formation of Pakistan to adopt a more

centralizing tone. These resolutions were amended unilaterally by Jinnah, without the consent of all parties initially involved (Jaffrelot 97). This created a major rift between the national leader's of Jinnah's Muslim League and the numerous provincial leaders in Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, and Baluchistan - regions that were historically autonomous, even under British suzerainty. These provincial leaders were under the impression that the new Pakistani state would be federal and would guarantee regional autonomy, especially where matters of language were concerned. In a speech in Dacca, East Pakistan in 1948, Jinnah declared: "*If we begin to think of ourselves as Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, etc., first and Muslims only incidentally, then Pakistan is bound to disintegrate*" (Jaffrelot 99). His reasons were clear: Pakistan must be strong, and provincialism was a poison that would only weaken the power of the state to defend itself against enemies. Unlike India, which used federalism to accommodate difference, Pakistan adopted and implemented much more centralizing institutional designs that in practice protected some groups, like Muhajirs and Urdu speakers over others, thereby weakening the state.

Jinnah adopted this new tone for a number of important reasons, even though his idea of "centralization" would ultimately lead to that very disintegration he warned against in 1947. His main motive was to create a unitary nation-state that could defend itself against India, where many Congress leaders laboured under the common assumption that Pakistan would fail since it lacked economic power, and more importantly, social cohesion. These various ethnic groups that were cobbled together by Sir Cyril Radcliff, the Chairman of the Indian Boundaries Commission, to create this new "Pakistan" were bound to disagree on a future course under a unitary government where the majority would prevail to the peril of smaller minority groups, and so they would naturally look to India for help. Congress wasn't wrong. Many Balochs, even today, seek asylum and covert Indian support to fight the Pakistani state.

India's Congress Party campaigned for independence on a platform of all religions and communities being as Indian as any other, which would be possible through federal structures after independence. Jinnah however campaigned on *religion* and the importance of Muslims staying together equally. What Jinnah did not understand, or chose to conveniently ignore, was that India's Muslims were separated internally by language, ethnicity, and caste. They were never one nation - and to convince them that they now had a nation to themselves to govern collectively, was a difficult task (Walsh 65). India and Pakistan both have high levels of internal diversity, but they have diverged in their management of this diversity in ways that led to state weakness in Pakistan and a much stronger state in India.

These tensions were further exacerbated when Jinnah announced to the people of East Pakistan (who were members of the Bengali ethnic group) and rather ironically in crisp English, that the "*State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language*" (Jaffrelot 101). In reality, Pakistan retained English unofficially in government and among its elite classes, but promoted Urdu among those who had no interest in learning Urdu. The Bengalis were naturally horrified at this announcement, culminating in a movement for self-determination that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 through a bloody civil war (with India's help). So were the Punjabis, the Sindhis, and the Balochs in West Pakistan. Unlike India, where English and Hindi were the joint official languages of the new state, Pakistan chose only one language, that was foreign to all of Pakistan's provinces. Ironically, the language was spoken more in India than in the new Pakistani state (Oldenburg 717). Jinnah saw benefits in adopting a language that was foreign to all of Pakistan's provinces. He argued that this would prove that there was no favoritism of any one community, and that they all had to learn a new language. It was, in his mind, a fair price to pay for national unity.

However, the community that remained open to this idea of Urdu dominance was the Mujahirs, a community of Muslims that migrated to Pakistan from the heartland of India. The Mujahirs spoke only Urdu, their mother tongue. This new community dominated Pakistan's business, military, and civil services in the immediate post-1947 era. 95 of the total 101 Muslims in the Indian Civil Service chose to leave India, and almost a third of them would be Mujahirs. This affected the communities existing in the new Pakistani state, especially the Sindhis, who expressed resentment at this foreign group taking over much of their land (Jaffrelot 107). The Sindh province of Pakistan was host to the city of Karachi, which was proclaimed Pakistan's capital. The Sindhis originally dominated this city, until over a million Mujahirs migrated from India and landed in Karachi, establishing businesses previously run by Sindhi Hindus (who left for India), and taking over government postings on behalf of the new government (Ansari 1998). Naturally, many Sindhis were left to wonder why they couldn't run their own city and their own province.

If one looks closely at the 95 civil servants that chose Pakistan, an even more interesting trend emerges. Based on a survey conducted in 1955, the rank of "Secretary" (the highest in the Pakistan Civil Service) was occupied by 19 from West Pakistan and 0 from East Pakistan/Bengal. The second highest rank of Joint Secretary had 38 from West Pakistan and only a mere 3 from East Pakistan/Bengal (Lambert 50). Despite hosting 50% of the population, Bengal was heavily underrepresented in the Civil Service of Pakistan, and in the military as well, which we shall now examine in closer detail.

The Military, its Inheritances, and the "Ethnic Imbalance"

The story of Pakistan's military dominance has been told in numerous versions. Some, like the famous Tufts historian Ayesha Jalal have argued that "bad legacies" have resulted in an easier

opportunity for Pakistan's military to outshine civilian structures. These legacies include poorer economic endowments (from the erstwhile British Raj), and a poorer share of India's tax base, administrative talent, and governance systems (Jalal 1985). These arguments deserve merit, and it is certainly true that India received the lion share of existing monies, civil servants, and military equipment. Others in this line of research have argued that the Muslim League was a weaker party compared to Congress, and couldn't keep its authority intact, especially after Jinnah's early demise shortly after the creation of Pakistan (Wilke 15). It is true that the Muslim League was a party without a "real base." They fought on religion, and relied on local Muslim leaders to win support among Muslim communities spread out in India's towns and villages. It is also true that unlike India, where Jawaharlal Nehru and his Congress Party ruled for the first 16 years, creating a strong and solid democratic foundation for the future Indian state, Jinnah's life ended a little over a year after the creation of Pakistan, in September 1948. He was unable to lay out his vision for Pakistan, leaving it to his successors who each lasted a few years in office. Some like Liaquat Ali Khan were assassinated, others like Sir Khwaja Nazimuddin and Mohammad Ali Bogra had to deal with internal fighting within the leaderless and rudderless Muslim League.

Steven I. Wilkinson, at Yale, argues something far different from the main theories summarized above. For Wilkinson, the curse was Pakistan's ethnic imbalance (Wilkinson 193). He writes: "... *West Punjab, had a quarter of the population but almost three-quarters of the infantry (in the army), while another major province, East Bengal, had virtually no representation despite having over half the population.*" Sindh was also underrepresented comprising a shocking 0% of the military. Bengalis were better off with 0.1% (Wilkinson 198). This wasn't all Pakistan's fault. The reason for this ethnic imbalance can be traced to British idea's of "superior races" - the Punjabis were classified by British officials as a "warrior caste," while the Bengalis and Sindhis

were not. The Bengalis were stereotypically farmers and academics, while the Sindhis were merchants and traders. So, it is no surprise that Pakistan inherited a military consisting mostly of Punjabi Muslims, and no Bengali or Sindhi Muslims. Most scholars, like Wilkinson himself, have argued that a high level of ethnic imbalance has been associated with severe problems for sustaining democracy. These imbalances also give rise to an increased likelihood of civil war and inter-community tensions (Wilkinson and Chandra 2008).

In addition, steps taken by Pakistan after 1947 didn't help solve this problem. One, no effort was made to recruit more proportionally. There was no government initiative to do so, and the Pakistani military was not interested in training new recruits, especially since war with India in 1948 took up much time and resources. Secondly, Pakistan declared its capital in Karachi, with Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi, both in West Pakistan. East Pakistan had nothing. The “center” of the new state was West Pakistan and its new Urdu speaking population. Thirdly, the Muslim League underestimated the power of Islam. Jinnah argued that Pakistan’s military would sustain because of Islam. He was wrong. Pakistan’s military obviously sustained because it was dominated by one group who encouraged recruitment within the same group. Jinnah did not realize that even within India’s Muslims, there were deep caste and ethnic divides that would require redressal in any new vision for an equal Islamic state (Wilkinson 200). The Punjabis, comprising 72.2% of the military, joined next by the Pashtuns (an ethnic group on the border with Afghanistan) who comprised 19.9%, and the Mujahirs who comprised 7.6% were of the view that the Bengalis and Sindhis would be unable to fight (an idea that is nothing more than racist and a result of British practices). Since they dominated the new state, they had their way (Wilkinson 199).

The American Influence on Pakistan

Many have opined that the creation of Pakistan was actually of American “doing,” it was the Americans, who feared the socialist leanings of the Indian Congress Party, that convinced the British to pursue partition. While I would not like to give this conspiracy theory much credence, I will discuss the early American role in Pakistan, and the opportunities seen by the Americans in a new Pakistani state, that date back to the pre-partition era. Importantly, it is this early American influence that continues to sustain, which is directly responsible for Pakistan’s military power and dependency on external actors (Tilly). It is no surprise that the Americans were interested in imposing their views on the post-World War II order. They were the clear winners of the War, emerging largely unscathed. In fact, in early 1941, the Americans appointed a Commissioner in British India, reflecting the importance shown by President Roosevelt to the Indian subcontinent's strategic importance (Raghavan 84). Jinnah’s denouncement of communism in a cabinet meeting three weeks after the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and his often public announcements to seek a closer alliance with the democratic powers of the U.K. and the U.S.A. impressed the Truman, and later Eisenhower administrations, while Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s early embrace of socialism and insistence on “non-alignment” alarmed many in Washington D.C. (Raghavan 123).

From the outset, American interests were firmly focused on Pakistan, especially due to its important geographical position next to Soviet Central Asia and to Iran and the Middle East. Assistant Secretary of State Henry A. Byroad, in a letter to Secretary of State John F. Dulles wrote: *“Pakistan is potentially an important contributor to Middle East defense and is strategically located between free Asia and the Middle East ”* (Raghavan 167). Dulles agreed. He was impressed by the religiosity and the fighting spirit of the Pakistani people, and he was also of the view that the future of the Islamic world would rest on Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey (Sunawar and Coutto 3). Successive administrations followed up on Dulles’ opinion, and Pakistan was included in the

1954 Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), an often forgotten organization that was akin to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a member of SEATO, Pakistan was supplied with modern weapons, superior to the ones possessed by India, who's arsenal dated back to World War II. These weapons were supplied for Pakistan's self-defense and in view of this new found alliance. In reality, Pakistan used these weapons to wage war with India in 1965 and to strengthen its defenses along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where the Afghans were adamant on redrawing the border to reflect their historic claims over territory they allege was illegally occupied by the British Indian Empire.

Pakistan's early dependence on the United States is in my view, one of history's most unusual alliances, that has weathered a closing Indo-US friendship and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Centeno argues that ex-colonial societies can never hope to develop since their economics is closely tied to global powers, and that such societies constantly look to external actors for support (13). Pakistan asked for its first loan from the Americans in 1948, a few months after independence, and their dependency has continued till date, flourishing in terms of aid to Pakistan's Armed Forces (Walsh 71). The military's dependence on this aid has achieved two things: (1) it has financed and enabled the military to dominate the state, and (2) it has kept the armed forces deeply interested in securing their position in the state despite returns to democracy after periods of warfare and military dictatorships. Christine Fair argues that the United States, through this financial support, has buttressed authoritarianism in Pakistan. From General Ayub in the 1960s to present-day, US military support has allowed Pakistan's military leaders to expand and equip the military with advanced weapons systems while also carrying on with their nuclear weapons program (Fair 572).

Pakistan's Military - A Hindrance to a Powerful State?

Pakistan's military continues to hinder any progress towards the creation of a strong Pakistani state, precisely because the military dominates the state and is an important institution in the psyche of many Pakistani people. Pakistan's military has also cultivated an idea of Pakistani nationalism, with the armed forces holding the most important place in that narrative. Pakistan inherited three things at independence: land, people, and the military. The land was mostly farmland in the Punjab, desert in Sindh, and mountains in Balochistan and along the Pakistani-Afghanistani border. The people were mixed ethnically, but shared the same religion: Islam (although divisions along Shia and Sunni lines also exist). The military, one of the remaining legacies of the Raj, was the only "legitimate" actor. Everyone trusted the military, even if they despised it, simply because it was a constant. It wasn't new. It was tried and tested. It worked. Lieven argues that this created a feeling among the new Pakistani people that the efficiency of the military can also be extended to the state. When the state failed to produce results, the people looked increasingly towards the military for guidance (Lieven 53).

After all, the threat of an Indian invasion has always existed in the minds of the Pakistani people, and the military was the only check they had to keep India on their own side of the disputed border. This has continued to be the case despite numerous defeats at the hands of Indian forces. The first major defeat in 1948 resulted in Pakistan keeping only a 1/4 of Kashmir, a province they claim in its entirety. Returning to seize the remaining Kashmiri land in 1965 resulted in another huge defeat, and a irreparable blow to the reputation of Pakistan's military dictator and president, General Ayub Khan, who was swiftly replaced by General Yahya Khan, who suffered his own defeat in 1971, when the military was unable to keep a hold of East Pakistan, which declared independence under the new name of Bangladesh. The 80s, dominated by General Zia ul-Haq, who ruled with an iron fist and plenty of American dollars to fund his government, resulted in civil

wars in Balochistan and Sindh, provinces that resisted the standardization and orthodox Islam imposed by Haq and his insistence on Urdu as the only language of state (Wilke 11). Despite these setbacks, the military perplexingly continues to dominate Pakistani society.

When Pakistan was created, it faced numerous issues that only the Pakistani military could address, since it was the only powerful and pre-existing institution from the British Raj. Afghanistan's government rejected the border with Pakistan shortly after the British left, and in October 1947, Pakistan launched a tribal invasion into Kashmir, prompting the Maharajah to quickly accede to India, to ensure his own safety and security. This dispute continues to preoccupy Pakistan and India. The military has therefore successfully argued for its continued importance: as long as war is on the horizon, the military must hold an important place in society (Fair 573).

It was in 1947 itself, before the Kashmiri accession to India, when a narrative appeared in Pakistani society that India does not accept Pakistan as a legitimate state, hoping to weaken its institutions and nationalistic spirit in an effort to reabsorb its land into an "*Akhand* (United) India." The military has used this narrative, disseminating it among its rank and in schools to nurture this perception (Haqqani, *Reimagining Pakistan* 130). For many insecure Pakistanis, the military guarantees their security. Since the military has been given this grand pedestal in society, it exercises its increased powers by interfering in political and economic matters. The citizenry of Pakistan do not object, since it is all done for their "own security."

It is because of this immense trust placed in Pakistan's military chiefs by the people themselves that has resulted in long periods of military rule in Pakistan. General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan, General Zia ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf (all of whom have also served as "president" alongside their role as Chief of Army Staff) have come to power with the express approval of vast majorities among the Pakistani populace. They also sought power through

coups in times of internal emergencies or during periods of tensions along the border with India, giving their positions more legitimacy (Fair 576). In recent times however, Pakistan's military has shied away from coups, instead exercising power through back channels, and letting civilian governments take the blame for all of Pakistan's ills, be it economic or political (Fair 584).

In addition, while Pakistan has continued to face ethnic rivalry among its various communities and tribes, the Pakistani military is the *only* institution to embody anything close to a feeling of Pakistani nationalism. The reason this has succeeded 73 years after independence is because the military wrote its own rules, the most important one being that civilian prime ministers and presidents would not interfere in the military-promotion process. The rationale was that Pakistan's civilian governments would be constantly split ethnically, and prime minister's may use their position to promote members of their own clans into the military hierarchy (Lieven 56). The hallmark of any democracy is that the civilian government controls the military. In Pakistan, this is not the case, which raises many issues. A general need not pay any heed to orders from Islamabad, Pakistan's current capital. Instead, they will receive orders from their own HQ, in Rawalpindi.

Pakistan's military also owes its success in large part to this isolation from government, but also to strong financial resources. The Pakistani government gives around \$8 billion USD to the Pakistan military every year (Al-Jazeera Media Network). While the military owes nothing to civilian governments, other than ensuring the security of the borders of the Pakistani state, it also draws a large amount of its power from the money invested by the military over decades in commercial investments and property investments. Many of these investments pre-date the Pakistani state, and were a direct inheritance from the British. Pakistan's military has its own corporation, called the "*Fauji* (Urdu for soldier) Group" worth an estimated \$1.48 billion USD. It

is controlled by the military hierarchy and not the government (Lieven 63). The military in many ways occupies spaces reserved nominally for the government. Investments in properties, companies, and airlines puts the military on an exalted position, placing any civilian leader at second-fiddle.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed in great detail the early Pakistani state, and the influences of the early framework on the country up until the 1980s under General Zia ul-Haq. We have also seen the legacies inherited by Pakistan upon independence from Britain, which cemented not only the irregular and unnatural borders, but also the influence of certain communities in the Civil Services and in the Armed Forces. These factors all contribute to the application of Tilly and Centeno to Pakistan.

Tilly's argument that the state and its agents successfully organize violence to repel enemies, both internal and external, simply do not apply to Pakistan in whole measure. Pakistan's security apparatus is independent of the "state," in the sense that the armed forces do not always adhere to orders from the national capital, instead exercising their power through legitimacy derived directly from the Pakistani people, who place tremendous faith in their military and its capabilities. We have also seen how far this loyalty goes, despite repeated defeats in war.

Centeno's principles also do not apply. Pakistan suffers from severe provincialism and ethnic conflict, despite multiple wars that have seemingly united the country under the military. What we have seen instead is that the military, owing to its own practices and rules, has insulated itself from the struggles of Pakistani society, acting as an independent agent instead of as an agent of the state. "Total war" has also failed to provide nationalistic feelings and faith in citizenship, also due to historical legacies that have not been adequately addressed.

This paper has not attempted to examine all aspects of Pakistan, be it their complex society, rich cultural traditions, and historical legacies. It has only attempted to scratch the surface, pondering early Pakistani realities in the context of well established research, conducted by Tilly and Centeno. It is apparent that these scholars and their research do not apply to Pakistan, despite similarities with their case studies. Instead, Pakistan is an enigma, a state that isn't the ideal country anyone would want to inherit. The remarkable fact is that it continues to linger on despite all of its flawed legacies, and perhaps the Pakistani Armed Forces deserve some credit for keeping *their* country together.

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