

The University of California Santa Cruz

**Analyzing the Effects of Federal Aid on  
Partisan Representation in the American  
States**

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## **Introduction**

Federal aid given to the various states has long been a contentious issue at both the national and state levels of politics. Certainly, the amount of federal aid given to a state often depends on many factors, including, but not limited to population size, environmental needs, and state emergencies or natural disasters. However, all too often the terms “small government” and “overregulation” are hurled by Republicans, especially on the campaign trail and in public addresses. As far back as his National address on January 11, 1989, President Reagan stated that “man is not free unless government is limited. There’s a clear cause and effect here that is as neat and predictable as a law of physics: As government expands, liberty contracts” (Reagan). Since Reagan was president, and arguably even before that, small, limited government has been a fundamental aspect of Republican ideology. Small government, fear of overregulation, desire to bring government “closer to the people,” and freedom from tyrannical government have long been popular Republican party campaign talking points. These points are carefully crafted as part of complex legislative strategies, but one glaring question remains. Why? Why is the Republican party so adamant about this platform, and is there something that can explain their continued use and dependence on it?

It is no secret that every state receives billions of dollars from the federal government every year in order to fund programs, such as defense, transportation, welfare, immigration, and education (Schroeder and Stauffer). Some states receive more than other states, and the type of aid received from the federal government also varies—some states receive more welfare aid, whereas other states receive more government contracts. What should be explored is whether or not this aid affects partisanship, and whether or not this aid affects the party platform of a major

political party. More specifically, if we analyze federal aid as a percentage of general state revenue, does more federal aid correspond to an increased Republican presence in states, and how are “small government” principles integrated into these states’ Republican party platforms? Namely, how central is “small government” to Republican elected officials’ campaign strategies?

In exploring these questions, this study argues that the amount of federal funding a particular state receives is correlated to the Republican party presence and their party platform in a given state. In doing so, it offers insightful knowledge as to the impact that federal funding can have on a state and the partisanship within it. By first exploring relevant literature, this work will explore the methods used to examine both federal aid and partisanship. Then, it will discuss the pertinent results found in the data among certain Republican states. Finally, this study aims to describe how the found results are relevant and can contribute to further research.

### **Majority Party Influence, Legislative Pork, and Types of Funding**

There is previous research, such as Knight who examines small state bias in the U.S. Senate. His research suggests that many of these states lean Republican (Knight 13). In the U.S. Senate, particularly, the majority party has influence over the amount of federal funds its state receives. Also, Albuoy has studied the partisanship of Congress members and federal funds, and again, the data on federal funding is related to who is in the majority, and the distribution of federal funds. For example, Albuoy states “the case that members of Congress in the majority have advantages in procuring federal funds for their state has both theoretical and empirical support” (Albuoy 139). This is very important, in that it lays the foundation for the focus of this paper, which is what happens once those funds are *already* distributed. Specifically, if it’s Kentucky, Mississippi or any other Republican state that gets the most funds, does that correlate

to a more conservative legislature? Does the receiving of government money, even when allocated by Republican legislators and Congress members, strengthen Republican ideology of “fear of tyrannical government?”

Furthermore, Steven Balla et. al. provide valuable insight as to the explanation of how pork, or extra money, is allocated in the political system. They argue that “it is rational, as a blame avoidance measure, for the majority party to cut the minority in on the allocation process” (Balla et. al 518). Thus, we can expect that some states controlled by the minority party will also receive high levels of federal aid, though perhaps each state just does not receive as much aid, or a lesser number of states will receive a lot of aid. This was important to this work when considering some of the outlier data, such as New Mexico or North Dakota. Additionally, Levitt and Snyder also contribute to this work by demonstrating that the majority party influences types of federal funds (Levitt and Snyder 958-959). While Levitt’s et al., argument primarily grapples with the Democratic party, the concepts it discusses are still relevant to the things I am discussing in my essay. Finally, in a report done by Schroeder and Stauffer titled *Federal Spending in the States, 2005 to 2014*, they examined the significant differences that appeared between certain states in terms of their funding. For example, the report elaborated on which programs made up the bulk of federal aid received by a state (Schroeder and Stauffer). Thus, this report was important to this work for considering the implications that the type of funding might have on a state’s dependence on the federal government.

Building on this existing literature, I propose that we analyze federal funding further. It has been established that the majority party can influence the dispersal of federal funds, but how do those funds affect the state party once they are already dispersed? How does the amount of

federal funding correspond to Republican campaign strategies that advocate for smaller government? Considering that many Republican campaigns advocate for small government, it seems ironic that certain states have such large amounts of funding, yet also have Republican unified governments. This work argues that if a state has more federal aid as a percentage of general state revenue, then there will be an increased Republican presence in that state.

Specifically, I hypothesize that in those states, we will see an increased proportion of elected Republican officials in state legislatures, governorships, the US House, and the US Senate. I expect that this increase occurs in part due to the Republican party platform advocating for small government principles, and that Republican candidates use this increase in federal funds in their state as part of a campaign strategy and platform to win their election.

### **Research Design**

Definitions are needed to clarify this hypothesis. Namely, *Republican presence* will be defined as the number of elected officials who are affiliated with the Republican Party, and this work will analyze the proportion of seats that the Republican party controls. *State legislatures* can be defined as both chambers of a state's government, not just one chamber, so that we are able to gain a more holistic perspective on a state's attitude toward federal funding. *Small government principles*, which are expanded on later, can generally be taken to mean language that includes phrases like "over regulation" and "unaccountable government." This language is often promoted by the Republican Party, at both the national and state levels. *Campaign strategy* refers to the strategy of using the amount of money a state receives from the federal government to attempt to, either directly or indirectly, demonstrate why voters ought to elect Republican candidates. Finally, *platform* can be understood to be a more permanent party strategy. There are

potentially serious differences between the way federal funding is perceived as part of a Republican Party campaign versus the way it would be perceived outside of a campaign.

In order to conduct this research, we must first examine the federal funding across several of the top states that receive high proportions of federal aid, as well as some potential outliers in the data. The Tax Foundation has compiled data on different states tax and funding levels for decades. Using the Tax Foundation's *Facts and Figures* data from the most recent fiscal year data (2011-2016), FYs 2011-2016, we can identify the "Federal Aid as a Percentage of State General Revenue" for various states (Cammenga et al.). The reason that this data is available through FY 2016 is due to federal aid often being distributed several years after the legislation itself was passed. The 2019 *Facts and Figures* report, for example, uses FY 2016 data to measure Federal Aid as a Percentage of State General Revenue, because that federal aid was likely allocated in 2016 and then used and calculated in 2019. This delayed impact of fiscal policy is common in many areas of government. This work relies on the idea of a delayed impact. Therefore, when examining a certain fiscal year, the corresponding year to examine is the legislative data from three years later. In essence, the reaction by voters to federal funding from a certain program, tax, or policy passed takes time before those reactions are reflected in the legislature.

Despite this tricky connection, I argue that federal aid as a percentage of state general revenue is an adequate measurement to use because it more clearly shows the key concepts of federalism that this paper seeks to demonstrate. Not only does federal aid as a percentage of state general revenue sufficiently demonstrate federalism in the sense that it shows state dependence, but it also demonstrates the different types of interaction a state will have with the federal

government as it obtains federal funds. The state government is not only receiving federal government funds, but if that state is unable to make significant money without the federal government, then they are essentially dependent on the federal government for the state to function. For example, a state could be dependent for welfare or retirement aid, and without the federal government to depend on, many states could not reasonably provide the benefits they do now (Schroeder and Stauffer). This also is not limited to welfare or retirement aid. The more a state government is dependent on the federal government for contracts or other funding, the more dependent on the federal government that state is overall. It is more beneficial to study federal funding as a percentage of general state revenue instead of, for example, a particular type of federal funding or a specific program, because the state not being able to generate enough revenue on its own and relying on federal aid is the exact type of situation, as shown in this work, that is especially ripe for Republican criticism of big, tyrannical government, and promotion of small, less regulatory government. A Republican argument might question the size of the government, whether or not people need the help of an even larger government, and seek to determine the benefits of investing that federal aid money directly back into the people.

Beyond determining the funding metric, we must also determine which states are most useful to examine. This work offers a case study of Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and New Mexico. These are states that demonstrate effects of federal funding in those states, whether it be through their party platforms and campaign strategies or whether it be through other factors. Additionally, other states, such as Nevada, North Dakota, and Alaska are interesting outliers which exemplify the diversity of the states.

In particular, Mississippi was chosen due to its consistently high rank in the amount of federal funding received, which can be seen in *Tax Foundation* numbers. mentioned earlier and discussed at length further. Furthermore, as a consistent Republican “trifecta,” meaning one party controls both chambers in the legislature as well as the state’s Governorship, Mississippi will be important to examine to truly understand how a state with high levels of funding can lean Republican year after year (National Conference on State Legislatures). Tennessee was chosen as part of this research primarily due to the compliment that it provides to Mississippi. Whereas Mississippi is number one or two in federal aid, Tennessee usually ranks in the top five, but not quite as high as Mississippi (Cammenga et al.). However, Tennessee still is, and has long been a strong Republican trifecta. Therefore, it can provide a valuable comparison next to Mississippi, to provide this research with more data as to how federal funding and partisanship are related in Republican trifectas.

Comparatively, Kentucky was chosen due to it being what I dub a “Switch” state. This reflects that Kentucky has switched from a divided government where different parties control different branches of the government, to a Republican trifecta, and will soon be back to a divided government in 2020. The federal funds that have been dispersed to Kentucky will be interesting to analyze as it relates to party platforms and campaign strategies utilized in the state. I note this with special excitement because their United States Senators, Senator Mitch McConnell and Senator Rand Paul are two of the most prominent Republican figures not just in Kentucky, but in the entire United States, yet they constantly preach values of “small government.” This is despite their state ranking fifth in out of the fifty states for federal aid in relation to state general revenue. Additionally, Missouri was selected because like Kentucky, party control of the government has

switched in the last several years, but currently has a Republican trifecta (*Post Election 2018 NCSL*). Thus, Missouri is a good state to examine in conjunction with Kentucky because both states are “switch” states. Furthermore, Missouri, while still remaining in the top ten in terms of its federal aid as a percentage of state general revenue, that rank has declined over the last several fiscal years (Cammenga et al.; Scarboro).

Finally, New Mexico, Alaska, North Dakota, and Nevada are important states to consider, because they appear to be somewhat of outliers in this research. For New Mexico, one might be surprised that despite having such a high rank of federal aid, New Mexico is actually a Democratic trifecta. Alaska, North Dakota, and Nevada all rank low among the states for federal aid as a percentage of general state revenue, but these explanations help to confirm the data found.

Logistically, to analyze the effects of federal funding these states were divided into three groups. The first group is “trifecta states,” which consists of Mississippi and Tennessee. The second group, “switch states,” consists of Kentucky and Missouri. The final group is “The Outliers” and discusses New Mexico, North Dakota, Alaska and Nevada. Upon examining a particular group of states, first we must determine the rank and percentage of federal aid as a part of a state’s general revenue. Seeing how this funding data changes over time, especially over the last five years, from legislative years (LY) 2014 to 2019 and from fiscal years (FY) 2011 to 2016 is critical because then we can match that funding with how the partisan composition of a state changes three years later. The partisan composition of the states is measured as a percentage of a state’s legislature and federal elected officials who belong to a certain party. Then, the intersection between the partisan percentage and the federal aid can be compared.

## **Federal Funding and Partisanship in the States**

The data compiled consists of six graphs and tables which show important data over a six year period, FY 2011 through FY 2016, which corresponds with LY 2014 through LY 2019. In this data, there is incredibly crucial information to decipher the effects that federal aid has on partisanship. All six graphs developed in this work depict a negative slope. This would indicate that if a state ranks lower among the fifty states for the federal aid it receives as state revenue, the state is likely to have a lower percentage of Republican elected officials. Also, this trend can be seen in every single year, regardless of who controls the majority party in the Congress. When Democrats controlled Congress in FY 2011, corresponding with LY2014, it could be expected that the top ranked state for federal aid as a percentage of state revenue would be represented by roughly 62 percent Republican elected officials (Graph 1). For each rank all the way through fifty, each rank a state decreases, one would expect to see a -.38 percent decrease in the amount of Republican elected officials in that state. However, this decrease is stronger in years where Republicans control the majority party.

When Republicans took control of Congress in LY 2015, the data showed a larger expected number for the percentage of Republican elected officials in the state that was most dependent on the federal government for revenue. As seen in Graph 2, one can expect the state ranked first for federal aid to be represented by roughly 68 percent Republican elected officials. Each rank lower, down to fifty, resulted in a -.42 percent decrease in Republican elected officials during FY 2012 and LY 2015. This correlation is significant because it confirms Albuoy's research in regards to the Republican party. In other words, Albuoy is completely correct when talking about the Republican party; when they control the majority party, Republican states get a

greater percentage of their revenue from the federal government (Albuoy 138-9). However, it appears that even when Democrats control the majority party in Congress, Republican states are still the ones more dependent on the federal government, introducing an important caveat to Albuoy's research.

### **Federal Funding and Partisanship in Republican Trifectas**

Mississippi and Tennessee are the first two states examined because they are each consistent Republican trifectas where federal aid comprises a large part of state revenue. In terms of this revenue, Mississippi has ranked first among all fifty states in every fiscal year except for 2015. In FY 2011-2014, and in 2016 Mississippi ranked first among all fifty states, with federal aid comprising as much as 49 percent of general state revenue (Drenkard; Cammenga et al.). Similarly, Tennessee has also ranked high among the states over the last several fiscal years in terms of the federal aid it receives for its state revenue. From FY 2011 through 2016, the lowest Tennessee ranked among the fifty states was eighth in FY 2015, with its lowest percentage of federal aid coming in that same year, comprising 38 percent of Tennessee's state revenue (Scarboro; Walczak).

In terms of Mississippi and Tennessee's partisan composition, both states have had Republican Trifectas since before FY 2011 and LY 2014. Out of the 181 total elected officials between Mississippi's state legislature, governorship, US Senators, and US Congress Members in LY 2014, 57 percent were members of the Republican party. Several years later, in LY 2019, Republicans still maintained strong control in Mississippi. Republicans still control the governorship, and have increased their presence in the State House, holding 74 out of 122 seats (*Post Election 2018 NCSL*). Out of the 181 total elected officials between Mississippi's state

legislature, governorship, US Senators, and US Congressmembers in 2019, 113, or 62 percent are members of the Republican party, and Republicans control all chambers of government in Mississippi. The constant Republican trifecta is interesting given the large amount of federal aid received year after year. In Mississippi, it is hard to determine whether an increase in federal aid corresponds to increased Republican partisanship, but certainly it could be argued that a constantly high level of federal aid corresponds to a similarly constant level of Republican government.

In Tennessee, there are similar trends. For example, in LY 2014, the Republican party controlled the governorship, as well as 71 out of 99 State House seats and 26 out of 33 State Senate Seats, along with having two Republican Senators—Bob Corker and Lamar Alexander (*2014 State and Legislative Party NCSL*). In Tennessee in 2014, seven out of nine U.S. Representatives were Republican. This meant that in LY 2014, Tennessee was 74 percent Republican. Five years later, in LY 2019, Republicans increased their control within the state slightly and are 77 percent Republican. However, for Tennessee, the most interesting year was LY 2017, wherein the partisan makeup during this year reflected the results of the 2016 election, as well as the response to fiscal policies enacted around FY 2014. That year, Tennessee ranked third among the fifty states in terms of federal aid as a percentage of state revenue, comprising 40 percent of state revenue (Stone). Sure enough, three years later in LY 2017 we can see the highest proportion of Tennessee Republicans in the state legislature. That year, Republicans controlled the Governorship, 74 out of 99 State House seats, 28 out of 33 State Senate seats, and had nine Republican U.S. Senators and Representatives for a total proportion of 78 percent of

elected officials representing Tennessee registered as Republican. (*2017 State and Legislative Party, NCSL*).

These trends seen specifically in these Republican trifecta states are significant because we can clearly see a correlation between a high percentage of federal aid that a state receives and the partisan makeup of a state and their elected officials. What is now important to determine is whether or not this funding becomes part of the Republican party platform.

### **Republican Party Campaign and Platform in Tennessee and Mississippi**

Federal funding weaves its way into Republican trifecta state party platforms in many explicit ways. The Mississippi GOP platform states that “we believe that government cannot and should not be the solution to all problems, Mississippi Republicans believe in policies that promote the entrepreneurial spirit... a framework of low taxes and sensible but not overburdening regulations” (*Mississippi GOP*). In this statement, we see keywords such as “overburdening” which shows the Mississippi Republican Party position towards government. This attitude is despite Mississippi’s state being more dependent than any other state on the federal government.

Conversely, Tennessee simply adopts the national Republican GOP party platform, rather than having a distinct state party platform. Tennessee is not the only Republican state to adopt the national party platform. In fact, it is somewhat common in Republican trifectas for this to happen. In the 2016 official Republican national platform, words such as “freedom” and “overregulation” appear over ten times their opening one page preamble (Cutrona and Talento). This clearly shows that in these Republican trifecta states, small government principles are still a central part of the party platform. In fact, it is so central that many of the other Republican party

stances, such as their positions on taxes and businesses can be traced back to the central position of advocating for small government. Yet, it is important to examine whether this a position held only by longtime Republican trifecta states. While there is a preference for small government, and a reliance on federal aid would appear to contribute to that preference, there is still the potential that certain states do not advocate for smaller government as centrally, perhaps because of the state or because of the other party issues. For these reasons, this work next examines states that have increased in their federal funds and have switched control in their government.

### **Federal Funding and Partisanship in “Switch” States**

As previously noted, Kentucky and Missouri are described as “switch” states in this work due to the fluctuation that each of these states have shown in their federal funding as a percentage of general state revenue. Each state has also fluctuated in the type of government that exists. In the past, divided government was quite common, but as of October 2019, both Kentucky and Missouri were Republican trifectas (*Post Election 2018, NCSL*). This begs the question as to what relationship federal funding has to party platforms and campaigns in states whose government has switched control of parties.

In FY 2011, Kentucky ranked seventeenth among fifty states when it came to federal funding as a percentage of general state revenue (Drenkard). 38.3 percent of Kentucky’s revenue came from federal funds that year (Drenkard). In FY 2012, Kentucky ranked seventeenth again, and in FY 2013, they ranked twelfth among the fifty states in federal funding (Stone). Suddenly, there was a large jump around FY 2014, and Kentucky ranked fifth (Walczak). It ranked fourth, then fifth again in FYs 2015 and 2016 (Cammenga et al.; Scarboro). This jump also corresponded, as seen in Table One, to a rise in the percent of Republican elected officials in

Kentucky. In LY2014, 52 percent of Kentucky's elected officials were Republican, but in LY2019, after Kentucky began relying more on the federal government for revenue, 66 percent of Kentucky's elected officials were Republican. This discovery is important to this work in order to determine the strength that the correlation between federal aid and partisanship impacted the platform of the Republican party in Republican-leaning states and helped campaigns succeed.

Missouri also ranks fairly high for its federal aid, however in recent years, Missouri's rank among the fifty states has been decreasing. In FY 2011, it ranked fifth, but in FY 2016 it ranked tenth among the fifty states (Cammenga et al.). Nevertheless, Missouri is still a state that has ranked consistently in the top ten in terms of federal aid received as a percentage of state revenue. Missouri transitioned from a split government and became a Republican trifecta when a Republican won the Governorship. Thus, one important thing to examine in terms of Republican party platform would be the particular campaign platform of Missouri Governor Mike Parsons. His successful campaign is likely to have valuable information as to the extent that federal aid could play for a victorious candidate.

### **Republican Party Campaign and Platform in Kentucky and Missouri**

Like Tennessee, the Republican Party of Kentucky also adopts the national Republican party platform. On their party website, however, it states that the GOP in Kentucky works on "reducing wasteful government spending, balancing the budget, and promoting economic growth and prosperity" (*Republican Party of Kentucky*). This shows that, even if it is indirect, there is some correlation between the federal funding that Kentucky has received and the importance of "small government" to the Republican party platform.

The Missouri GOP platform is written in an odd, almost cult-like way. It clearly opposes the Democratic party, particularly former President Barack Obama. Specifically, the Missouri GOP states that “We believe that the first 7 years of the Obama-Biden administration have been marred by an unprecedented level of government spending and overreach. National Democrats have abused the political process to pass a health care bill that we believe to be unconstitutional. They have accelerated already unsustainable federal spending and racked up record amounts of debt” (Missouri GOP). Thus, what we can see here is a clear opposition to big government and government spending, yet Missouri has still been one of the highest ranked states in terms of federal aid as it relates to general state revenue.

As far as Governor Parson’s campaign, while he advocates for sensible policy that invests in citizens of Missouri, and has touted his business accomplishments, there is not a direct position about “small government” on his campaign website. This is not to say that he did not campaign under those principles, since they are part of the Republican party, but maybe they were simply not as central as some other ideas, such as business growth and job creation.

### **The Outliers: New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, and Alaska**

Finally, it is important to analyze potential outliers in this research because that allows for the clarification of potentially weak data points. For instance, New Mexico relies heavily on federal aid, but the partisan composition of elected officials in New Mexico is significantly different from the partisan composition of the other four states (*Post 2018 Election, NCSL*). Second, the type of funding that New Mexico, North Dakota, Nevada, and Alaska state governments receive compared to these other four states is of a significant difference. And third,

the Republican party campaign platform takes a noticeably different tone than Kentucky, Missouri, Mississippi, and Tennessee.

In spite of New Mexico ranking third, with 41.2 percent of its general state revenue coming from federal aid New Mexico is not a Republican trifecta (Cammenga et al.). In fact, historically, New Mexico has had a split government. In LY 2016, while Republicans did not control New Mexico's state senate, holding only 17 out of 42 seats, however it did control the state house, with 37 out of 70 seats, as well as controlling the Governorship (*Post Election 2018, NCSL*). In 2019, control of government changed, and now New Mexico is a Democratic trifecta. This is particularly perplexing, and encourages further query into alternate explanations for this.

One explanation for this large amount of federal aid can be seen in a 2016 Pew Research Center study. It indicated that New Mexico received much more federal aid in the form of government contracts and grants, whereas states like Mississippi received much more federal aid in the form of governmental welfare and retirement benefits (Schroeder and Stauffer). Therefore, different types of government spending in New Mexico versus other states may be a key reason as to why New Mexico, even though it trends Democratic, still receives a significant amount of federal funding. It is simply that the type of federal funding is different. This would imply, then, that the type of federal funding further impacts the partisanship within a state. States receiving more retirement and welfare benefits from the federal government, instead of receiving grants or contracts, may be more Republican in their state governments.

Another potential explanation for this could rest on "blame avoidance theory" (Balla 516). This theory states that the majority party is likely to still give a cut to the minority party when it comes to legislative pork (Ibid. 518). Legislative pork means extra funding for a certain

state or program that will benefit a certain constituency. Perhaps another potential explanation for New Mexico's divergence from states such as Kentucky, Missouri, Mississippi, and Tennessee in terms of federal aid is that New Mexico is a part of the blame avoidance tactic by Senate Republicans in Washington. As Knight pointed out, Senators have more influence over policy than Congressmembers (Knight). Therefore, since the US Senate is Republican controlled, New Mexico perhaps is receiving more federal funding right now simply as a "cut" to the minority party (Balla 517-519).

Clearly, New Mexico, as a Democrat-leaning state, has explanations for why it ranks higher for federal aid as a percentage than other Democratic states. Likewise, states like North Dakota, Alaska, and Nevada have explanations for why they rank lower than other Republican states for federal aid as a percentage of general state revenue. The federal government owns 84.9 percent of Nevada, so it stands to reason that the state is not dependent on the federal government, because the state is only responsible for fifteen percent of the land (Lilly). Additionally, Nevada has no state income tax, but rather generates revenue from "sin taxes" and sales taxes. North Dakota and Alaska, on the other hand, lean Republican, but rank low for federal aid due to their reliance on severance taxes from oil (Casselman and McCann). Ultimately, there seems to be outliers for both Republican and Democratic states, which is important because it means that the correlation between a state depending more on the federal government and a greater proportion of Republican elected officials is generally true.

### **Republican Party Campaign and PR Strategies in New Mexico**

The different types of federal funding that New Mexico has received has certainly affected the way its GOP party behaves. Rather than large "we believe statements" displayed

across the website, or advocating for more ideological issues, New Mexico's Republican party clearly states that their main goal is to win back the House, gain seats in the Senate, and win New Mexico for President Trump (*Republican Party of New Mexico*). For New Mexico, the central issue is not one of ideology about small government, but rather the central issue is about winning and electoral victories. That is not to say, of course, that the New Mexico Republican Party does not advocate for smaller government, but simply that the issue is not as central in this particular state. Nevertheless, the statements from the Republican party in New Mexico echo that of Ronald Reagan. The party platform in New Mexico states that "The bigger our government gets, the less free we become. The concepts of individual liberty and states' rights that our founders intended, and established, have made America great. Today those ideas and our liberty are under assault by the very government intended to serve and protect us" (*Republican Party of New Mexico*). Ultimately, what can be concluded from the evidence in New Mexico is that in this Democratic trifecta, with different types of federal funding, the principles of small government are not as central to the Republican party campaign platform as electoral victory is. This demonstrates that funding could have a stronger effect in states that already lean Republican. It is possible that perhaps federal aid as a percentage of state general revenue does not cause more Republican leaning elected officials, but does strengthen the campaigns of elected officials in already Republican states.

### **Analysis and Discussion**

Overall, this research demonstrated four important things. First, it demonstrated that a negative correlation exists between federal aid as a percentage of general state revenue and the proportion of Republican elected officials in a state. States that are more dependent on federal

funds for their revenue are consistently more Republican. Albuoy's theory was able to be partially applied to this work, because when the Republicans controlled the majority in the U.S. Senate and Congress, more aid was given out to Republicans, and deep-red Republican trifectas were able to be more dependent on the federal government than in other years. However, it appears that regardless of which party controls Congress, states that are more dependent on federal aid for their revenue tend to consistently be more Republican-leaning states. This added facet to Albuoy's theory is important for considering the long term effects of federal aid in a state.

The second relevant point this work made was showing that federal funding has an effect on party platforms across all of the states, regardless of how Republican that state is. In all of the states, "small government" or "overburdensome regulation" was included as part of the Republican party platform. Yet, each state differed in terms of how central federal funding and dependence on the government was as part of their party platforms. This is relevant for considering further impacts of the centrality and effectiveness of using federal aid as part of the state party platform.

The third thing this research demonstrated was that there certainly exists a correlation between federal aid and partisanship, but there could be other factors that explain how dependent states are on the federal government. Nonetheless, in this research, in each table created, certain states were outliers on the tables or graphs. This could have been through "blame avoidance" tactics, or simply a result of a different source of revenue for the state. However, because the outliers are easily explained, this suggests that the general correlation made in this work about federal aid as a percentage of state revenue and partisanship might be stronger than it appears.


Finally, this research shows a unique demonstration of federalism. When a state receives federal aid, that aid reflects on the state, and that aid is internalized and becomes part of the party platform in a state, but especially the Republican party platform. Fiscal policy passed can be seen affecting legislative control a few years after it is passed. Further research could be considered to determine if this timeline applies differently to separate fiscal issues, or whether or not one type of policy affects legislative control more quickly than others.

## **Conclusion**

There are a few discrepancies within the research that must also be justified. First, politics is incredibly unpredictable and so there are sometimes anomalies. For example, in the November 2019 Kentucky gubernatorial election, a Democrat won, which will soon mean that Kentucky will not have a Republican trifecta. This could prove hopeful for the Democratic party as they now have an opportunity to govern and legislate in Kentucky. Further research could also be done on the specific impacts of the type of funding a state receives. Because states receive different types of funding, is there a chance that a certain type of funding affects partisanship more than other types of funding? Is this what we witnessed in New Mexico? More research can be conducted that further builds on the works of Albuoy, Balla, Knight, and Levitt, and hopefully this one. Since this paper primarily focused on the effect that high rates of federal funding had on the Republican party, another paper could examine the effects that high rates of federal funding have on the Democratic party or third parties. In conclusion, however, we can distinctly see a correlation between the amount of federal aid as a percentage of general state revenue and the increase in the centrality of “small government” in Republican party platforms.

**Graph 1:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

FY2011/LY2014



State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue

Y Intercept: 62.6


Slope: -0.381

**Table 1:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

State Rank for Federal Aid as % of General State Revenue FY 2011	State	% of Republican Elected Officials LY 2014
1	Mississippi	56.91%
2	Louisiana	60.13%
3	Arizona	58.82%
4	South Dakota	77.06%
5	Missouri	67.31%
6	Tennessee	74.31%
7	New Mexico	43.22%
8	Montana	59.09%
9	Georgia	66.80%
10	New York	30.86%
11	Texas	64.10%
12	Wyoming	89.13%
13	Maine	39.27%
14	Oklahoma	73.89%
15	Iowa	51.59%
16	Ohio	64.24%
17	Kentucky	57.70%
18	Rhode Island	9.32%
19	Alabama	65.33%
20	Idaho	81.81%
21	South Carolina	63.89%
22	West Virginia	42.14%
23	Florida	62.63%
24	Oregon	41.84%

25	Michigan	57.57%
26	Arkansas	54.93%
27	Nebraska	-----
28	Vermont	29.35%
29	North Carolina	65.05%
30	New Hampshire	44.99%
31	Indiana	70.99%
32	Maryland	27.64%
33	Pennsylvania	55.84%
34	Illinois	36.86%
35	Kansas	76.16%
36	Wisconsin	59.44%
37	California	28.97%
38	Colorado	44.54%
39	Utah	81.98%
40	Massachusetts	15.57%
41	Washington	44.37%
42	Minnesota	43.39%
43	New Jersey	40.74%
44	Hawaii	9.87%
45	Connecticut	34.36%
46	Nevada	41.43%
47	Virginia	61.68%
48	North Dakota	73.79%
49	Delaware	33.33%
50	Alaska	65.62%

**Graph 2:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).



State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue

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Y Intercept: 67.57

Slope: -0.422


**Table 2:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

State Rank for Federal Aid as % of General State Revenue FY 2012	State	% of Republican Elected Officials LY 2015
1	Mississippi	56.91%
2	Louisiana	60.78%
3	South Dakota	81.65%
4	Tennessee	77.08%
5	Missouri	71.63%
6	Wyoming	86.17%
7	Arizona	61.76%
8	Georgia	67.59%
9	Montana	69.23%
10	New Mexico	47.46%
11	New York	34.98%
12	Alabama	71.33%
13	Maine	47.64%
14	Oklahoma	76.43%
15	Oregon	38.77%
16	Ohio	67.55%
17	Kentucky	53.74%
18	West Virginia	61.43%
19	Idaho	80.90%
20	Texas	66.36%
21	Nebraska	-----
22	Vermont	34.24%
23	Iowa	55.41%
24	Arkansas	66.90%

25	South Carolina	63.88%
26	Rhode Island	13.56%
27	Michigan	60.71%
28	North Carolina	65.05%
29	Indiana	73.45%
30	Florida	66.84%
31	New Hampshire	59.44%
32	Utah	83.78%
33	Maryland	33.67%
34	Pennsylvania	59.48%
35	Massachuttes	21.10%
36	Washington	45.00%
37	Colorado	50.00%
38	Wisconsin	62.23%
39	California	31.25%
40	Minnesota	48.58%
41	New Jersey	40.74%
42	Nevada	61.42%
43	Kansas	79.65%
44	Illinois	38.88%
45	Elware	37.87%
46	Virginia	62.33%
47	Connecticut	40.51%
48	Hawaii	11.11%
49	North Dakota	72.41%
50	Alkasa	62.50%

**Graph 3:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

FY2013/LY2016



State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue

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Y Intercept: 66.32

Slope: -0.436


**Table 3:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

State Rank for Federal Aid as % of General State Revenue FY 2013	State	% of Republican Elected Officials LY 2016
1	Mississippi	61.32%
2	Louisiana	61.44%
3	Tennessee	77.08%
4	South Dakota	71.65%
5	Missouri	71.63%
6	Montana	58.44%
7	Georgia	67.19%
8	New Mexico	47.46%
9	Alabama	71.33%
10	Maine	48.69%
11	Wyoming	86.17%
12	Kentucky	53.54%
13	Oregon	38.77%
14	Arizona	59.80%
15	Idaho	80.91%
16	West Virginia	61.43%
17	Oklahoma	75.16%
18	Rhode Island	13.56%
19	Ohio	67.55%
20	Indiana	73.46%
21	Vermont	33.70%
22	Arkansas	66.90%
23	Michigan	59.39%
24	Texas	66.82%

25	North Carolina	65.05%
26	Nebraska	-----
27	Iowa	55.41%
28	Florida	66.31%
29	Pennsylvania	59.12%
30	South Carolina	63.88%
31	Utah	84.68%
32	Massachusetts	18.87%
33	Maryland	33.16%
34	New York	34.98%
35	Colorado	49.09%
36	Wisconsin	62.24%
37	Washington	48.12%
38	New Hampshire	59.44%
39	Minnesota	48.11%
40	Illinois	38.88%
41	New Jersey	38.52%
42	California	31.82%
43	Nevada	58.57%
44	Kansas	79.07%
45	Delaware	37.88%
46	Connecticut	40.51%
47	Virginia	61.68%
48	Alaska	57.81%
49	Hawaii	9.88%
50	North Dakota	73.10%

**Graph 4:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

FY2014/LY2017



State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue

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Y Intercept: 67.5

Slope: -0.419


**Table 4:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

State Rank for Federal Aid as % of General State Revenue FY 2014	State	% of Republican Elected Officials LY 2017
1	Mississippi	61.20%
2	Louisiana	60.13%
3	Tennessee	77.78%
4	Montana	60.39%
5	Kentucky	67.35%
6	Missouri	72.11%
7	South Dakota	85.32%
8	Georgia	66.80%
9	Maine	48.69%
10	Oregon	39.79%
11	Arizona	58.82%
12	Wyoming	87.23%
13	Ohio	68.21%
14	Alabama	70.00%
15	West Virginia	63.57%
16	Rhode Island	12.71%
17	New Mexico	42.37%
18	Oklahoma	79.62%
19	Idaho	84.54%
20	Vermont	33.15%
21	Arkansas	77.46%
22	Florida	64.21%
23	Indiana	74.07%
24	New York	34.16%

25	North Carolina	65.05%
26	Iowa	59.87%
27	Michigan	60.61%
28	Texas	64.54%
29	Nebraska	-----
30	Pennsylvania	61.68%
31	South Carolina	65.00%
32	Maryland	33.67%
33	Washington	47.50%
34	Colorado	46.36%
35	Utah	83.78%
36	New Hampshire	55.94%
37	Massachusetts	19.81%
38	Wisconsin	63.64%
39	New Jersey	37.04%
40	Alaska	59.37%
41	Illinois	40.91%
42	Delaware	39.39%
43	California	29.54%
44	Minnesota	53.77%
45	Kansas	71.51%
46	Hawaii	7.41%
47	Nevada	38.57%
48	Connecticut	46.50%
49	Virginia	61.04%
50	North Dakota	84.14%

**Graph 5:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

FY2015/LY2018



State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue

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Y Intercept: 64.11

Slope: -0.334


**Table 5:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

State Rank for Federal Aid as % of General State Revenue FY 2015	State	% of Republican Elected Officials LY 2018
1	Louisiana	60.78%
2	Mississippi	60.65%
3	Arizona	57.84%
4	Kentucky	66.66%
5	New Mexico	42.37%
6	Montana	60.38%
7	Oregon	39.79%
8	Tennessee	75.69%
9	Missouri	69.71%
10	Alaska	59.37%
11	Arkansas	74.64%
12	Ohio	67.54%
13	Alabama	70.00%
14	South Dakota	85.32%
15	Vermont	33.15%
16	West Virginia	54.28%
17	Georgia	64.42%
18	Maine	47.64%
19	Michigan	60.60%
20	Wyoming	87.23%
21	Texas	64.54%
22	Indiana	73.45%
23	New York	31.68%
24	Rhode Island	13.55%

25	Florida	62.10%
26	Oklahoma	76.43%
27	Idaho	84.54%
28	Iowa	59.87%
29	South Carolina	63.33%
30	North Carolina	65.59%
31	New Hampshire	53.41%
32	Washington	46.25%
33	Maryland	32.66%
34	Pennsylvania	60.94%
35	California	29.54%
36	Nevada	37.14%
37	Nebraska	-----
38	New Jersey	34.07%
39	Massachuettes	19.81%
40	Illinois	40.90%
41	Wisconsin	60.83%
42	Minnesota	53.30%
43	Colorado	45.45%
44	Utah	81.98%
45	Connecticut	45.64%
46	Delaware	39.39%
47	Kansas	71.51%
48	Hawaii	6.17%
49	Virginia	51.29%
50	North Dakota	84.13%

**Graph 6:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

FY2016/LY2019



State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue

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Y Intercept: 63.56

Slope: -0.411

**Table 6:** State Rank for Federal Aid as a Percentage of General State Revenue, Corresponding with the Percentage of Republican Elected Officials (State Assemblies, State Senates, Governorships, US House, US Senate).

State Rank for Federal Aid as % of General State Revenue FY 2016	State	% of Republican Elected Officials LY 2019
1	Mississippi	61.75%
2	Louisiana	61.43%
3	New Mexico	33.05%
4	Arizona	52.94%
5	Kentucky	65.98%
6	Montana	59.09%
7	Tennessee	77.08%
8	Wyoming	87.23%
9	Alaska	62.50%
10	Missouri	71.63%
11	Alabama	77.33%
12	West Virginia	59.28%
13	Arkansas	76.06%
14	Indiana	72.22%
15	Oregon	37.75%
16	Ohio	66.88%
17	Vermont	26.63%
18	Georgia	60.47%
19	Maine	37.69%
20	South Dakota	84.04%
21	Oklahoma	77.07%
22	New York	29.63%
23	Michigan	52.12%
24	Florida	59.47%

25	Texas	58.18%
26	Rhode Island	11.86%
27	Idaho	80.00%
28	Pennsylvania	54.01%
29	California	23.86%
30	New Hampshire	41.49%
31	Iowa	57.32%
32	Nevada	31.42%
33	South Carolina	63.88%
34	North Carolina	56.45%
35	Colorado	40.00%
36	Nebraska	-----
37	Maryland	30.15%
38	Washington	41.25%
39	Massachusetts	18.39%
40	Illinois	34.34%
41	New Jersey	31.11%
42	Connecticut	36.41%
43	Delaware	36.36%
44	Minnesota	45.28%
45	Wisconsin	61.53%
46	Utah	78.38%
47	North Dakota	82.76%
48	Kansas	70.35%
49	Hawaii	7.41%
50	Virginia	49.35%

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